THE New Republic

Eisenhower's "New Diplomacy"

Editorial

Pages 3-4

Pictures at an Exhibition

Russian Reactions to American Art

by FRANK GETLEIN

"Pat" Brown—The First Lap

by DAVID G. FARRELLY

Cost of a Mistake . . . . . *Selig S. Harrison*

The Worker as Young Tough . . . *Irving Howe*

A Reporter with Nixon . . . *Edward P. Morgan*

AUGUST 24, 1959

25 cents

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Washington Wire

Tangled Web

THERE was a two-hour wait at the huge new air-conditioned Miami Airport whose architecture is like an inner section of the Hudson Tunnel. In no time at all, of course, we were revolving the racks of drugstore paperbacks. Six huge racks with about 130 titles each, plus more on counters, maybe 800 in all, ranging from Medieval Readers to modern erotica—their emergence and diversity as much a sign of the times as the resonant announcement of plane departures.

One rack seemed to be devoted to tortured young ladies all dangling in uncomfortable positions, the covers of the volumes by Mickey Spillane (who seems to be the master of this metier) telling how many millions had been sold; another collection showed the same young ladies being devoured by various kinds of scientific monsters, mostly green. A third rack seemed to be largely Life Among the Deviates, and homosexuality, while right across from it by strange juxtaposition were religious books.

How do you untangle a civilization like this? In the first rack was *Chris—Life in the Limbo of Lesbianism*, a Beacon Book, 35 cents, by one Randy Calem —"an intimate story of the 3rd sex told with tenderness and unblushing honesty." There were titles like *Old Girl* ("She fought—she struggled—she even married a man!") and *The Deviates*; always set down with a sly emphasis on their "tenderness" and "honesty." And right across the way, William James' *The Varieties of Religious Experience: Glorious Koran; Dead Sea Scrolls* by A. Powell Davies, and *On the Imitation of Christ* by Thomas à Kempis.

Maybe you can't have your 50c Thomas à Kempis without your Mickey Spillane. This column has always disliked censorship. The trouble is that commercialized sale of this sort of thing always has to get more sensational as the adolescent taste palls. Sometimes, we confess, we could lend support and encouragement to an outbreak of old-fashioned Victorian prudery.

Our Japanese-made vest pocket radio began talking fluent Spanish as we got off the plane. The Governors' Conference at Puerto Rico this year was notable for the strong intimation coming from Governor Rockefeller's party that he is a Presidential candidate. Most of the stories suggested that the personable governor is going to tie his decision to the polls: that he will wait till November and throw in his hat if his stock is then rising and Nixon's falling. Personally for what it is worth, we got a different impression. We thought the Rockefeller decision was already taken—that he will be a candidate in any event. It was amusing to hear the Democratic governors present in the hibiscus-scented atmosphere good-humoredly and (so far as we could judge) disinterestedly saying Nixon would be a lot easier to beat than Rocky. "People just don't trust Nixon," was the way kindly, silver-haired Governor Hodges (D, N.C.) quietly put it.

"Let Cuba Alone"

TWO ITEMS linger from the conference. Alaska-Hawaii statehood has vastly stimulated the same drive in Puerto Rico. It is a disastrous movement in many ways, but an inevitable historical consequence of admitting non-contiguous areas.

Absentmindedly the United States has adopted the rigid system of making stray bits of real estate irrevocable parts of the parent body. How far it will spread nobody can guess.

The other item was the advice dropped by wise Munoz Marin, governor of Puerto Rico, who has given his country one of the few impeccably honest administrations in Latin America. Looking out over the violet Caribbean from the tropical garden atop the craggy fortifications (begun before the Pilgrims landed) he advised the United States not to meddle with Cuba. Cuba is just over the way; Munoz knows all about it. Earnestly he told us he did not think Communism there a serious menace. Mistakes—? Certainly! But let Cuba alone. Let it make its mistakes. That is the advice one of the wisest men in Latin America gives us.

Mirror, Mirror, on the Wall

THE USSR Exhibition in New York has closed. It put determined emphasis on sputniks, heavy industry and the robust life designed to impress America (just as we, in reverse, are trying to impress Moscow with consumer goods.) It is odd what nations pick to boast about—almost as revealing as the exhibits themselves. How different a realistic sampling would be. Imagine sending that Miami drugstore paperback library to Moscow, deviates and all! How would sensitive Congressmen feel about that?

Some of the USSR paintings and photographs we thought magnificent; there were stocky Tanyas and Katinkas doing men's work and racing all over the place for the good of the Party. "In 1958 in the USSR over 6300 book titles were published," one sign said—circulation several billion. In the medical section we somehow couldn't get away from the voice telling how they performed the two-headed dog operation. Overhead was a picture of a fond Slav mother unabashedly nursing her baby under the sign, "from the day of their birth all Soviet children are provided with free systematic medical observation and assistance."

"The surgeon must remove sections of the lung . . . " said the projection box, the third time. It was then suddenly that the thought occurred to us: What would happen if "Chris" and her fellow US deviates found themselves in the USSR? What kind of a tender-but-oh-so-honest account would the author write of this encounter?

We could not keep from thinking it would be quite good for Chris; let her train for a few relay races, stick her in a steel mill for a year or two, then let her clean streets and pitch hay. The idea, we must say, was appealing. The US could stand Chris' absence for quite a spell and as for her—well, it might make a difference in her outlook on things.

T.R.B.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Republic
A JOURNAL OF OPINION

VOL. 141, NOS. 8-9, ISSUES 2336-37
AUGUST 24, 1959

THE WEEK 3
The "New Diplomacy"; Food Fit to Eat; Unions Are the Target; Unbending Steel; One Part Politics, Two Parts Emotion; A Reporter with Nixon

ARTICLES 9
"Pat" Brown—The First Lap
by David G. Farrelly
Pictures at an Exhibition
by Frank Getlein
The State of the Unions—VI
by Warner Bloomberg, Jr., Joel Seidman, and Victor Hoffmann
India, Pakistan and the US—II
by Selig S. Harrison
The Superficial Aspect
by Gerald W. Johnson

BOOKS 27

THEATER 30

GILBERT A. HARRISON, *Editor & Publisher*
HELEN FULLER, *Managing Editor*
SELIG S. HARRISON, *Associate Editor*
ROBERT EVETT, *Book & Music Editor*
F. R. RUSKIN, *Asst. to the Publisher*
Contributing Editors: Frank Getlein, B. H. Haggin, Irving Howe, Christopher Jencks, Gerald W. Johnson, Stanley Kauffmann, James E. King, Jr., Helen Hill Miller, Louis H. Pollak, Michael Straight

Published weekly (except for omissions of four summer issues) and distributed by The New Republic, 1244 - 19th St., N.W., Washington 6, D. C. Phone: REpublic 7-8656. Entered as second-class matter September 26, 1950, at the post office at Washington, D. C., under the Act of March 3, 1879. Single copy 25¢. Yearly subscription, $8.00; Foreign, $9.00, Armed Forces personnel or students, $5.00. Subscribers desiring change of address should notify us at least three weeks in advance. Please include both old and new address. Copyright © 1959, by Harrison-Blaine, Inc.

Summer Schedule

FOR A short time each summer, *The New Republic* is published every other week. This year, summer issues will be dated July 6, July 13, July 27, August 10 and August 24. Weekly publication will be resumed on September 7.

•

THE NEW REPUBLIC
1244 19th St., N.W., Wash. 6, D. C.

The "New Diplomacy"

IT IS EVIDENT that Mr. Khrushchev has been eager to do by himself what he had to do with Mr. Bulganin in the days when the team of "Krush & Bulge" toured foreign countries. Having risen from the ranks, having then cowered for years beneath the arm of Stalin the Terrible (who would go off occasionally to confer with Roosevelt and Churchill), he—the ex-Party-bureaucrat and ex-hatchetman—now finds himself in command of a Soviet Union that is distinctly more powerful than it was in Stalin's day. Under the circumstances, he may not be immune against the temptation to bestride the world stage. Plain Nikita Khrushchev, the self-made man of the people, must get some satisfaction from the prospect of being the statesman upon whom all eyes are turned as, stepping from one continent to the next, he holds the destiny of the world lightly in his open hand.

The talks he has had with Mr. Nixon and the forthcoming exchange of visits with the President are vibrant with an irony that will not be lost upon historians. For it was the Mr. Nixon who enthusiastically shouted "Peace and Friendship" from Moscow to Pervouralsk (and in Russian!) who not so long ago rode to glory on the Hiss case. And it is the Party of Mr. Nixon and Mr. Eisenhower which has so stridently insisted on its identity as the Party of no-compromise, of liberation of Communist captives, and which time after time implied that its opposition was "soft" if not traitorous. And it was Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. who, attending his first United Nations meeting as US delegate in 1953, self-righteously did away with the old Assembly opening-day custom—the stiff handshake with the Soviet delegate. "Don't you understand?," Mr. Lodge told reporters, "I shall not be shaking hands. There has been a change in Administration in Washington."

There have been further changes since then. The American mood has changed and so has the Soviet Union and the balance of power between the two countries. We do not deplore the talks that are to take place—some good may come of frank, face-to-face confrontation. But it should be noted that the "new diplomacy" of the President is consistent with the *leitmotiv* of his Administration. The dominant theme has been relaxation. Budget-balancing has been given precedence over a determined national response to national needs. The alternative is genuinely *competitive* coexistence, but the cost of that course is high in money and self-denial.

Mr. Khrushchev has now attained at least the minimum objectives of his "ultimatum" last November on Berlin—and possibly his maximum objectives. It was never in the cards that the Russians were looking for a real showdown on Germany: the time was premature. The military power on their side has been rising steadily in relation to the power opposed to them at least since about 1955. But their supply of Intercontinental Ballistics Missiles—their one genuine hope to overcome the extraordinary Western lead in capacity to inflict thermonuclear destruction between continents—is not yet in hand. In another six months, which is 15 months after the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Berlin "ultimatum" was made, they *may* begin to have an ICBM force that is a real threat to our Strategic Air Command. Six months or a year or two thereafter that threat could become a decisive factor in conflicts such as the one over Berlin. But of this moment it is not decisive, and Mr. K. knows full well that it is not.

There is, of course, a military threat to the West. It is simply that the US reliance upon the nuclear deterrent, in which the remainder of NATO has meekly if not eagerly acquiesced, makes every major crisis a contest of wills in which elements of fortitude and folly, ours against theirs, are inseparably intermingled. While the Strategic Air Command remains overwhelming, the odds are on our side. But the odds do not add up to certainty. The alternatives which confront our European allies are becoming far too uncomfortable. The choice between concessions, such as recognition of the East German People's Republic, and massive retaliation in the event that Khrushchev's overconfidence leads him to rash action, is rapidly becoming one which no popular government can be asked to make. When the alternatives facing our European allies are virtual annihilation in a nuclear war—whether local or intercontinental makes little difference to them—and concessions, it becomes increasingly hard to expect them to stand firm. Of course, it *does* make a difference to Mr. K. whether the annihilation is local or intercontinental. But we are banking mighty heavily upon being able to keep him convinced that *we* will not permit him to inflict local damage without incurring total assault, and that our Allies will steadfastly support us. So far we have gotten away with it. But time is eroding the basis of this stoic pose.

But if a showdown based upon his growing military power was not Khrushchev's Berlin objective, what was? Many suggestions have been made, all of which more or less resemble the probable truth. Excision of the Berlin "cancer," liquidation of NATO, and abandonment of US overseas airbases lie at the extreme and are much beyond what Mr. K. actually hoped for. A Berlin "settlement" that would be tantamount to recognition by the West of the East German regime's legitimacy and permanency probably comes rather closer to what Moscow regarded as possible. Certainly it reflects the need to consolidate the Communist hold on East Germany in order to get greater productivity from its factories—which are already contributing substantially to the Soviet economy. But it is difficult not to believe the Russians may be well content with having got East German representation at the Geneva Conference as a first step in a line of progress they regard as inevitable anyway. The important thing was to gain from the West agreement to set the stage for these inevitable concessions, which to the Kremlin and to Mr. K. specifically was the attraction of the Summit.

Look at the opportunities that now lie open before Soviet diplomacy. Khrushchev wishes peacefully to ride history's coat tails, to "bury" the capitalist world under the accumulating pile of Soviet material achievements. And how can he do this better, with minimum resort to the awesome risks of nuclear war, than from a Summit in permanent session?

Much has been made of the importance of letting Mr. K. see the United States, our productivity, our strength, even our family life. This benefit ought not to be scorned, for if we cynically rule out the possibility that experience may educate, we rule out all hope. Yet it is not the productivity and strength of the United States but of Russia that needs to be better appreciated, and that by the man in the world who counts most—the President of the United States. Nor is the education of the Soviet leader a prime purpose of his coming. Mr. Eisenhower insists there will be no "negotiations," only an effort to reach a better understanding. The distinction is so subtle as to be almost imperceptible. Mr. Nixon did not go to Moscow to "negotiate" but he hadn't been with the Soviet leader five minutes before they were talking about controversial substantive matters in dispute. We don't know what proposals—new or old—Mr. Eisenhower intends to discuss. But we trust he has proposals and that they are most carefully thought out. For Mr. K. is not coming to play bridge or tour the countryside. He has long been ready to talk business.

Food Fit to Eat

THE DISCLOSURE that 50 different kinds of food are being checked for radioactivity by the Food and Drug Administration came as a welcome sign last week. It looks as if we are finally going to find out how much our diet has become contaminated by nuclear weapons tests, after being kept in the dark by the blind negligence of the Atomic Energy Commission. We are emerging from a strange period—a period in which the AEC insisted it didn't have enough money or manpower to monitor foods in the heavy fallout areas, yet found enough to start measuring the contamination of foods in such places as Chile and Burma and to carry out a large number of esoteric biological experiments.

Measurements of the strontium-90 in alfalfa and ensilage reported last week (there seems to be more concern for cattle than people) showed that concentrations had shot up to 10 times the maximum "permissible" limit for foods. If such levels are found in foods eaten by humans, there may be some panic unless someone explains how the intake of strontium-90 can be reduced.

Scientists have shown during recent months that it can be reduced in many ways. But no one in the government has told the public how to take some of these simple precautionary meaures. This would be tantamount to admitting there is a problem, and no one in authority is quite ready to go that far. Admitting there is a problem

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

might make it more difficult for the AEC and the Defense Department to resume testing without restrictions as they seem bent on doing as the October 31 deadline on the test moratorium draws near.

Unions Are the Target

THE MOST DISTURBING ASPECT of the House approval (229-201) of the Landrum-Griffin labor bill, which must now be dealt with by a House-Senate conference committee, is that the original intent of remedying evils brought to light by the McClellan Committee was so thoroughly mangled. What began as a legitimate attempt to curb racketeering, corruption and dictatorial rule in some unions became in the showdown last week a mindless attack on unionism.

There are two major provisions of the Landrum-Griffin bill which illustrate why it must be classed as an anti-labor, rather than anti-racketeering measure. One is the indiscriminate ban on organizational picketing. This provision is nominally addressed to the "blackmail picketing" which pressures an *employer* to support a particular union in its organizing effort. But the bill as drafted actually bans all organizational picketing. It is plainly calculated to impair future unionizing of the unorganized workers in the new industries of the South, and to a lesser extent the West. The very thin varnish which has been used to gloss over this clause is a proviso permitting brief picketing in the event that 30 percent of the employees are first organized by word-of-mouth (and then the union has all of 30 days of picketing to organize the rest!). By contrast, the Elliott bill, which had been reported out by the House Labor Committee, sought to restrict "blackmail picketing" by empowering the employer to demand a special election followed by a nine-month ban on further elections in the event (the most likely event in such cases) that no one union received a majority vote.

In the case of secondary boycotts, which are the subject of the other major punitive provision of the Landrum-Griffin bill, the disinterested observer must conclude that the abuse of this weapon, as in the Teamsters' exploitation of "hot cargo" agreements, can wreak grave injustice on employers who should not be held responsible for all of the labor malpractices of the companies on which they depend. Here, however, carefully-drafted legislation would distinguish between the differing types of labor practices which the offending employer may be supporting. And it would certainly not be couched in language which seems to affect all picket lines and thus to deny basic rights of free speech. A picketing steel worker apparently could not, without possible violation of the Landrum-Griffin bill, appeal to a truck driver making a delivery at a struck plant to cease his deliveries.

Why did 92 Southern Democrats join the Republicans to give Speaker Sam Rayburn an unprecedented rebuke by voting against the middle-ground Elliott bill which the Speaker had so strongly endorsed? Granted the relative impotence of unionism in the South and the power of local Chambers of Commerce, Elliott's bill surely was strong enough to have been defended as a positive rebuke to Jimmy Hoffa. Among Rayburn's 20 House Democratic colleagues from Texas, 16 voted against him, one of them being Lyndon Johnson's protege and the occupant of his old House seat, Rep. Homer Thornberry of Austin's 10th District. It is most unlikely that Thornberry would have decided on a matter so crucial against his mentor's wishes. Moreover, the Senate Majority Leader is always able to exert great pressure on House Democrats when he chooses, through Senators from the same state. Why did he not do so? Was his lassitude inspired by a desire to cut down Presidential aspirant John Kennedy? Perhaps. Johnson's behavior was at least consistent with the unexplained suddenness with which he scheduled the Senate vote on the labor bill on April 22, catching Presidential aspirant Hubert Humphrey out of town.

Unbending Steel

THE NEW GENERATION of hardboiled management technicians in the steel industry embarked on an interesting experiment when its negotiators demanded contract changes from the United Steelworkers that would sharply alter established practices covering seniority, work schedules, incentives and work standards, the scheduling of vacations and various other matters which, they argue, are desirable to let management promote maximum efficiency—efficiency, in the lexicon of management, being another word for profit. But in mass production industries, the right of the union to have a voice in work schedules and the establishment of "norms," to write down in contract language legal protection of tens of thousands of workers from sudden and unilateral changes, is at the heart of the union's responsibility to its members.

Such things involve both the practical question of how much pay is earned for how much work, and also the psychological factor of self-respect, re-established in a worker by the fact that in spite of his helplessness as an anonymous individual among faceless thousands, he can deal with a supervisor, a plant management from a position of strength—his rights under contract enforceable by grievance procedure or other techniques. However much the 500,000 steelworkers might be influenced by propaganda saying their wages were "inflationary," they cannot be deluded about the meaning of speed-ups or by verbiage about norms and incentives. On such matters, the companies cannot win even after they reduce their inventories sufficiently to be interested, once again, in making steel.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

One Part Politics, Two Parts Emotion

ONE WOULD NOT anticipate much Congressional interest one way or another in a bill which describes itself as designed "to establish rules of interpretation governing questions of the effect of Acts of Congress on State laws." Yet a year ago such a bill, HR 3, was adopted with fervor by the House of Representatives, over Presidential protest, and failed in the Senate by only one vote. And a revived HR 3 has been pushed through the House in this session by the *familias* GOP-Southern Democratic coalition. Few who voted either way clearly understood what the legislation would accomplish. And should the Senate Judiciary Committee, which has completed hearings on the bill (S 3), decide to send it to the floor, the same confusion would prevail there.

HR 3 has two parts. The second part would overturn the Supreme Court's conclusions, voiced in the *Nelson* case five years ago, that Congress in enacting the Smith Act tended to preclude parallel state prosecutions for sedition against the federal government. The first part of HR 3 ranges much farther afield. It would provide broadly that *no federal legislation of any kind should be regarded as inhibiting state legislation in the same area unless the federal law expressly so provides* (which very seldom happens), or unless the two enactments present such "a direct and positive conflict . . . that the two cannot be reconciled. . . ." In theory, the asserted need for the bill arises because under our federal system most matters entrusted to the national government are also subject to a measure of state control. The apparent anachronism that two sovereigns may simultaneously have power over the same behavior stems from the Supreme Court's early, and highly practical, recognition that "supreme" federal laws (or, it may be noted, the absence of such laws) need not *preclude* state regulations unless and until Congress so decrees. Thus, for example, federal enactment of the minimum wage of $1 per hour for persons engaged in interstate commerce would not bar New York from assuring all its residents, including those engaged in interstate commerce, $1.50 per hour, unless Congress were to determine, for some obscure reason, that a uniform national economic policy would be jeopardized by New York's law.

But this simple illustration unfortunately obscures the typical, endlessly recurring, difficult cases—difficult precisely because they involve problems of accommodation which neither Congress nor anyone else could anticipate when Congress lays down broad national policy. Thus it has fallen to the courts—and ultimately the Supreme Court—to determine whether New York could apply its workmen's compensation laws to railroad workers, whether Minnesota could penalize those who discourage enlistment in the army, whether Utah could entertain a union charge of unfair labor practices which the appropriate national agency declined to adjudicate, or whether Arizona courts could try a civil action against Navajo Indians living on a reservation.

For more than a century, the resolution of such questions has been one of the principal—and, on the whole, one of the signally well performed—functions of the Supreme Court. It belabors the obvious to point out, merely on the examples given, that performance of this task cannot be aided by a blanket Congressional directive, such as HR 3, to act in favor of sustaining state authority whenever humanly possible. The exercise of state authority is desirable whenever it harmonizes with the demands of the dominant national policy. But this abstract "good" gains meaning only in terms of a particular exercise of state power and a particular national policy.

TO BE PRECISE, the actual starting point for the doctrine of what is called "federal preemption" was the great case of *Gibbons* v. *Ogden,* in 1824: there Chief Justice Marshall held that New York trespassed on federal statutes designed to nurture American shipping when its legislature granted to one syndicate a monopoly of all steamboat traffic on the Hudson. But if *Gibbons* v. *Ogden* —a decision of enormous political and economic import —were reargued in the light of HR 3's presumption in favor of state power, the most popular judgment the great Chief Justice ever rendered might well have to go the other way.

"Might well have to"—not certainly, but very possibly. For one of the very great difficulties with HR 3 is the difficulty of knowing what it means. As Attorney General Rogers put it of HR 3's predecessor bill in the last Congress:

> This bill would create great confusion in important areas, raising difficult and substantial legal and practical problems. It would require persons who are operating in full conformity to federal statutes which wholly govern their field of operations, suddenly to conform their operations also to the rules of each of the states in which those operations may be conducted. Under this arrangement, a railroad clearly operating in interstate commerce and in full conformity with federal safety requirements, might find it necessary, under threat of criminal punishment, to conform to wholly different standards asserted by any one or more of the states in which it operated.

Moreover, HR 3 not only seeks to fasten its leech-like deference to state law upon all existing federal legislation—and thereby invite relitigation of literally thousands of issues settled since *Gibbons* v. *Ogden*—it also purports to squint through a glass darkly, with a states' rights bias, at every federal law to be adopted in the limitless future. Perhaps Rep. Howard W. Smith, author

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of HR 3, was right in assuring his colleagues: "This bill is not substantive legislation." Rather it is a clamor for anarchy. It deserves to be termed, as the Justice Department termed it, "most hazardous."

What breeds this kind of Congressional irrationality? Superficially, the ingredients are clear: *First*: particular irritation at the Supreme Court's very sensible feeling in the *Nelson* case that chasing spies and revolutionaries is a federal responsibility. *Second*: continued hostility to the *school segregation cases* (which rest on wholly different constitutional principles) by Southern Congressmen ready to swat the Supreme Court with any bat that comes to hand. *Third*: a querulous assertion of power by the right-wing Republican leadership in the House. *Fourth*: the exigencies of survival for the House coalition of Southern Democrats and reactionary Republicans.

Added together, these elements account for a House majority of 225—111 Democrats, most of them Southern, and 114 Republicans. Ranged in responsible opposition to HR 3 were 162 Democrats, led by Emanuel Celler of New York, and a small band of 30 Republicans headed in remarkable fashion by freshman Rep. John V. Lindsay, also of New York. It was Lindsay—displaying a perspicacity seldom evident in his predecessor, Frederic Coudert—who ceaselessly taxed the proponents of the bill for concrete arguments in favor of "a proposal so unnecessary in basis, so irresponsible in concept, so uncertain in meaning, and so chaotic in operation." He was answered with silence, with but a single exception: Said Republican Rep. Donald L. Jackson: "My support for HR 3 is, in major part, emotion." The emotion is that of legislators chafing at their impotence to fashion more than the general outlines of national policy. They have read in manuals of government that law-making is a legislative function. But, indisputably, law-making is also the province of the President to execute and the courts which interpret the law.

Laws, like the Constitution, are—for good or bad—changing instruments of the shifting generation which they serve: they are worked upon, and altered, by every agency of government which deals with them. Courts have the last word—but only chronologically, and only for the disposition of particular controversies. A Congressman who feels a proprietary interest in a particular application of the broad policies he launches does not understand the limits of the institution within which he works. This is, perhaps, part of the difficulty besetting Howard W. Smith, author of the Smith Act, critic of the *Nelson* decision, and author of HR 3.

A Reporter with Nixon

Berlin

AT DINNER in Warsaw the other night, a seasoned, sensitive American journalist whom I have known a long time said to me: "You know, back home I think I was a pretty wild, radical Democrat. But the more I live and work abroad, the more conservative I become." It is doubtful if the 80-odd working American reporters and photographers in the Nixon party have emerged from their journey as a sold phalanx of black Republican votes, but I believe each of them would testify that this trip to the USSR was a sobering experience. It was Mr. Hearst's Bob Considine, I think, who started his dispatch the first Sunday we were in Moscow with, in effect, the following lead: "Westbrook Pegler and I after a capitalistic breakfast and a visit to the Kremlin today obtained our copies of *The Daily Worker* and headed for 10:30 o'clock mass."

Near the end of the trip, another distinguished correspondent—not Columnist Pegler—observed, only partly in jest, that "if these bloody Russians can't run a war any better than they run Intourist, we'd better fight them now." In actual fact, the US Embassy in Moscow, which did a magnificent job of mothering us all, was astonished that the Intourist logistics held up so well. Nothing like this invasion had ever happened before in the history of all the Russias, czarist or Communist. Imagine, if you can, a horde of Red Chinese journalists descending on Minneapolis and demanding telephone and telegraph facilities, complete with Mandarin-character teletypes and bilingual operators, so they could clear their covies of 2,000-word dispatches instanter to Peiping; imagine that and you have a rough idea what the communications commissar in Novosibirsk, Siberia, was up against. But the dispatches got through. I even made two broadcasts from Sverdlovsk which, though known as the Pittsburgh of the Urals, is not a regular switch point on the ABC Network.

Surely never before had so many individual Soviet citizens been exposed to such personal, intensified contacts with foreigners. Individually and in packs for 11 days these dacron-clad Richard Harding Davises roamed the cities and suburbs of Moscow, Leningrad, Novosibirsk, Sverdlovsk, Pervouralsk and Degtyarsk (Siberian industrial centers) questioning everybody in sight. Counting the ubiquitous and tireless Admiral Hyman Rickover and assorted British, French, Italian and Australian journalists this meant that some 100 professionally inquiring minds were quizzing thousands of Russians. (Although we penetrated "closed" Siberian cities, we never actually got out of the huge *Russian* Socialist Republic.)

These encounters were more cryptic than they would

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

have been without the language barrier and they were admittedly superficial, but a first exposure is often the most valuable one. One morning in Sverdlovsk in a market place not far from the cellar where Czar Nicholas was executed in 1918, an American embassy official who spoke Russian acted as a conducting officer and translator for a dozen reporters. Braving the frowns of the displaced Intourist guides and foreign ministry attachés, they talked to six or seven separate groups of Siberians—perhaps well over 100 in all—who were eager to see and size up these strange decadent Americans. The encounter was friendly and spirited, devoid of the stooge questions so artlessly sprung on Vice President Nixon.

Why, then, my opening note of caution? Why isn't this person-to-person contact the only way to wage the Cold War? Why don't we just send over jetloads of articulate Americans to break down the barriers of misinformation and get on zestfully with peaceful competition?

Let me try to illustrate why bold, unorthodox schemes are not enough and indeed why, sometimes, the most cautious procedures may be too much.

In the tangled red tape of departure for Siberia, I hurried out of the washroom in the Moscow Airport leaving my camera behind on a hook. Before I had cleared the door, a most inexpensively dressed Russian was putting the apparatus back in my hands with an admonishing smile.

After wallowing in the luxury of a hot tub and dreaming of a refreshing pony of vodka, I misplaced a plastic shoe horn in the community bath house in the basement of the Bolshoi (Grand) Ural Hotel in Sverdlovsk. The next morning, the attendant, an old woman in a coarse grey smock and white kerchief (more out of Goya than Gorki) recognized me. Solemnly she selected a key from her apron, unlocked a table drawer, drew out the shoe horn and presented it to me as if it were a platinum spoon.

AGAINST such simple honesty, innate friendliness and curiosity of the people smash the heavy propaganda and policy engines of The System, pushing the human, reachable qualities of the bulk of Soviet citizens out of reach.

The Nixon entourage hadn't been in Moscow 48 hours when *Trud,* the official trade union daily, published what purported to be a letter from an employe of the Danulofsky public market complaining that the Vice President had insulted him during an unexpected visit to the place by offering him 100 rubles, cash. The accusation was as phony as a Kerensky kopek. What had happened was that the market workers, unlike other Muscovites encountered on earlier sorties, recognized Nixon and clustered about him clamoring for tickets to the American Exposition in Sokolniki Park which he was officially opening that day. In the confusion of translations Nixon got the mistaken impression that they couldn't afford the tickets (priced only at one ruble, or 10 cents, each) and, without any money himself, he—too hastily, it might seem in retrospect—asked an aide to produce some. The workers quickly explained they didn't need money but couldn't get tickets. Nixon ordered 200 sent to the market and no currency was passed but from this slender well-intentioned thread *Trud* spun the whole cloth of its distortion which was to ensnare him everywhere he went. At last reports the cloth was still being stretched; the *Trud* letter writer had upped the alleged sum of the Vice President's non-existent tip to 1200 rubles.

Take the Case of the Tossed Fruit. Sitting in the window of his Sverdlovsk hotel room one afternoon, an American correspondent spied a couple of engaging children playing in the courtyard below. In a standard GI reflex gesture he tossed them an orange (supplied in the first instance by Intourist). Within hours the aggressive manageress of the Bolshoi Ural had summoned two other bewildered reporters to her office and darkly accused each of them, separately, on the basis of purported parental protests, of having tried to undermine, in effect, the integrity and patriotism of Soviet youth with a juicy sphere of fruit.

It quickly grew into a federal case with the mayor, foreign office attachés and the Vice President's press secretary, Herbert Klein, all incredibly involved. There were demands that the two journalists be hailed officially before the mayor. Klein, an unusually cool, canny and utterly disarming operator, quickly pointed out that the mayor was Nixon's official host but if he wanted to turn an international good will visit into a kind of kangaroo court, that was his honor's own responsibility. The incident was dispatched forthwith, and the nostalgic fellow who had actually tossed the orange to the children was never involved.

It is the unbelievable contrivance of such calculated nightmares, the ballooning of hideous fiction from a molecule of innocent fact, which wilt the eager good will of visitors and leave them wary and deeply concerned, convinced only that there is no simple, easy way to tackle monumental misunderstandings therein. And yet we cling in an irrepressible American way to a hope that personal contacts must not only be sustained but broadened even though, as Vice President Nixon himself has privately calculated, it may take half a century or more to leaven a little this closed society.

There is one circumstance which may help us in this process but which at the same time bears large dangers because of the risk of counter-action and reprisal. It is one big inherent weakness of The System: the failure of the regime to inspire the affection, enthusiasm and trust of the Soviet people in their own Communist leaders.

EDWARD P. MORGAN

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Pat" Brown—The First Lap

by DAVID G. FARRELLY

TEN DAYS before the California Legislature adjourned, the California Poll reported that Gov. Edmund G. (Pat) Brown had received a two-to-one vote of public confidence on the job he has done since taking office the first of January. Fifty-one percent of those interviewed thought Brown's actions deserved approval; 22 percent indicated disapproval and 27 percent held no opinion. In this year of the "Taxpayers Revolt" it is not surprising that those who disapproved of the Governor's performance cited "new taxes" or "too much taxation" as the major reason for their adverse criticism. When one recalls that Brown was elected last November by 59.7 percent of the popular vote, the poll would indicate that he has thus far carried out successfully one of the principal tasks of a politician—maintaining popular support. It may come in handy when the Democratic convention of 1960 rolls around, for Pat Brown gives no indication of reluctance to advance himself as a Presidential—or at least Vice Presidential—candidate.

Before and during last year's campaign there were many informed persons who thought that Pat Brown was primarily a genial, hail-fellow type, careful not to stub his toe on his way up the ladder. He was eager to please and disinclined to offend. He avoided decisions. If Brown was a liberal, he was a mild one. Now, however, at the end of Brown's first seven months as Governor, any idea that he is a second-rater requires revision.

Candidate Brown had offered the voters an eight-point program. He promised *a more prosperous California* through the establishment of a department for economic development, *aid for small business* through special services, *consumer protection* by a public defender's office, *equal job opportunities* by enactment of an FEPC law, *labor-management peace* and a union democracy law, *economy in government* by reorganization of the executive branch, *support for education* to relieve the school and teacher shortage, and a *state water-development program* which, though nebulous at the time, would be his personal responsibility. Campaign speeches repeated these main themes and were supplemented by Brown's "fish-and-game" pitch, his "modernize-the-electoral-process" talk, and other items designed to attract special groups of voters.

His inaugural address on January 5 contained 12 main recommendations to the Legislature and a promise of more to come. The campaign pledge to aid small business fell by the wayside, but the other planks were all included. In addition, he proposed election reforms, more social welfare, tighter control of crime, protection of public health and improvement of the administration of justice. The duty of this administration, said the Governor, "is to bring to California the forward force of responsible liberalism."

One would draw the longbow to suggest that a political cyclone subsequently struck Sacramento. However, an objective assessment of Brown's first months would have to admit that the state capital has not seen such an example of executive leadership, such partisanship, or such a list of accomplishments in many a moon.

The road ahead was far from smooth as Brown prepared to take office as the first Democratic Governor in 20 years. The first state convention of the AFL-CIO met early in December and warned that the Democratic Party was "now on trial" to see if it lived up to its campaign pledges. Labor delegates threatened to fight any additional sales taxes, insisted on state management of water and power projects, and expected the Democrats to adopt legislation similar to that recommended by organized labor.

The Governor-elect wasted no time in selecting his official office staff. Fred Dutton, his campaign manager, was named to the key post of executive secretary. Julian Beck, former Democratic leader of the Assembly and an Earl Warren appointee to a judgeship, was made legislative secretary. Charles Johnson was picked for departmental secretary. These three men are able and strong. Brown's press secretaries, Hale Champion and Jerry Maher, had worked in the campaign as had Dick Tuck who was named travel-political secretary. The role of the Governor's staff and their influence on measures, tactics and strategy is significant in any appraisal of Brown's success.

The Governor's choice of department heads brought forth some complaints. In particular, Bert Levit, chosen

DAVID FARRELLY, *associate professor of political science at the University of California, is co-author of* The Politics of California.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

—The Sacramento Bee

Governor Brown

for the top-paying job as state director of finance, was suspect because he is a Republican and on the conservative side. But Brown needed a tough, devoted man for the chief budget spot and relied on an old associate. When Levit left the key finance post on July 31 to return to private law practice, he was replaced by John E. Carr, a businessman from southern California who has been a life-long Democrat. In Southern California there was editorial comment that Brown had neglected the area below the Tehachapi Mountains (where live 60 percent of the population) in handing out his major administrative positions. Generally speaking, however, his appointments have been good although some of them have rankled ardent Democrats and special interests.

The major problems faced by the incoming Governor were: (1) an immediate deficit of nearly $70 million in the 1958-59 budget which Brown inherited from Goodwin Knight; (2) his own 1959-60 budget and the increased taxes to balance it; (3) a solution to the water problem of the state; (4) union democracy legislation. Although both houses were in Democratic control (Assembly 47 to 33 and Senate 26 to 13) the necessary two-thirds majority for fiscal legislation required some Republican support.

In the opinion of this writer, Pat Brown has done a remarkable job. Without enjoying the patronage power of New York's chief executive, California's Governor is always up against it in pushing through a program. Great skill, political know-how, leadership and cooperation are essential. In the high tradition of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Brown has placed the public interest above everything else. And the public interest, ever a vague and debatable concept, certainly requires a champion in this state of government by pressure groups.

Attesting Brown's devotion to the public welfare, there is hardly an interest group in California today that is happy with all of his legislative accomplishments. He has managed to draw the fire of the state employees' association (for insisting on a 5 percent pay raise instead of 7½ percent); farm groups for seeking a minimum wage for agricultural workers; organized labor for his consumer taxes on beer and cigarettes and his union democracy bill; management groups for the union democracy bill and a minimum wage of $1.25; supporters of the University for cutting out building funds; the American Legion for his stand against increasing veteran aid; church and temperance groups for abolishing dry zones around college campuses; liquor retailers for his veto of a price-fixing bill. Even the parents of children in private military schools have been hostile since he went along with an economy move to withhold money from the California Cadet Corps. If, as the California poll reports, Brown is still popular in the Golden State, then it must be with the people as a whole, for he has certainly alienated more special interest groups than any Governor in a long, long time.

In mid-April Brown went on a two-day tour of the state. By that date his administration had scored several legislative firsts in state history. The rural-dominated Senate had passed his FEPC bill (on final vote it was a partisan victory—21 Democrats and 2 Republicans for, 4 Democrats and 10 Republicans against), the Assembly had approved his minimum wage proposal (later killed in the Senate), a state water fund had been set up involving the largest amount ever put aside for water projects, and tax increases of some $120 million had already been scheduled—the largest increase in more than a generation.

Brown's defeats came late in the session. The minimum wage legislation failed to get out of the Senate Labor Committee. Opposition was heavy from farm groups, restaurant and hotel men, cleaning and dyeing groups and Republicans generally. Tackling one of the state's most sacred cows—the oil and gas industry—Brown's proposed 2 percent increase in the severance tax was defeated in the Assembly Revenue and Taxation Committee. This was Brown's only revenue measure to lose out—seven others were approved. Just before the Legislature adjourned, he met his third major defeat when labor and management teamed up to exert sufficient pressure on the legislators to kill the union democracy bill.

But the accomplishments far outweigh the failures.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Cross-filing (California's unique system of letting candidates run in the primary of parties other than their own) was abolished. Old-age payments were increased $5 per month. State employees got their first pay raise since 1957. By requiring advance tax payments from insurance companies and by making economies within the departments of government, Brown's administration cut the impending July 1 deficit from $68 million to $10 million. (The state actually ended this fiscal year in the black as revenues exceeded expectations.) Brown's own budget, 1959-60, is a balanced one. Expenditure of some $2.2 billion has been authorized making this the largest budget in the state's history. To raise the money Brown and his finance chief, Bert Levit, developed an across-the-board tax scheme. Practically every taxpayer will feel the pinch and the state will receive $231 million in extra tax income. In a sudden switch of strategy, Brown cleverly pushed the tax bill through the Legislature first, and then worked for passage of his budget. Since California has the item veto, this gave the Governor added leverage against legislators who might tack on further appropriations. The Governor let it be known that pet bills would suffer the veto if legislators would not go along with his legislation. In the midst of the tax struggle he threatened to expose the hypocrites who vote for larger appropriations but who vote against tax increases. On his water program he sent personal letters to publishers urging wide coverage of the forthcoming bond referendum.



—The Los Angeles Times

"Brown" Shoes

In terms of public relations Brown has used all the tricks. He has issued press releases, made radio and TV appearances and covered the state with his speeches. At a special Senate election in April, Brown went all out, as did the Democratic Party, to support Ronald Cameron, turning the occasion into a miniature referendum on Brown's program. Since the leading Republican candidate made "no new taxes" his rallying cry, Cameron accepted the Governor's tax program as his main issue. Loss by Cameron to the Nixon-supported candidate, Weston Brunker, would possibly have upset the state Senate balance on the tax question and could have injured Brown's entire legislative program at that juncture. Cameron won handily.

It is significant in this hitherto non-partisan state that Brown's efforts in Sacramento have been made within the context of determined *party* endeavor. Although he made the usual plea for bipartisan support "where the good of the people is involved," Brown's program was a Democratic one. Moreover, he worked hard to keep members of his party together on all issues. His lieutenants in the Legislature did yeoman service. Sometimes pressure from the Governor got quite intense; in May the Speaker of the Assembly agreed to enforce the rule against allowing outside persons on the floor, especially administration spokesmen and the Governor's aides. On one occasion, a committee chairman cut off argument by saying, in effect: "We know how we're going to vote—why argue anymore?"

Party unity is never easy, and it was especially hard to maintain this year with a nucleus of veteran Democrats who expected to exercise the power long denied them, plus a stable of eager liberals who wanted to make their own mark.

The real measure of Brown's success is that when the Legislature finished the Democratic lawmakers were still united, Republicans in the Assembly were openly engaged in fratricidal combat, and one Senator had changed his registration from Republican to Democratic! Perhaps another token of Brown's success is revealed in the ridiculous charge of "irresponsible radicalism" out of which some Republican old-guard legislators are now trying to make political capital. This latter charge is, of course, 180 degrees away from other current criticism that Brown is too conservative—his tax program is regressive and the water plan favors vested interests.

One bit of incidental intelligence. The 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution was proposed to the state in 1866. Two months ago the California Legislature at long last ratified it. "Irresponsible radicalism"?

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pictures at an Exhibition

Russia's Reaction to the US Show in Moscow

by FRANK GETLEIN

"THE exhibition is a complete failure," said my guest, helping himself to another cigarette and signaling the waiter for another cup of coffee. The speaker was Victor Gorokhov, a Moscow literary gent of the middle ranks. He writes for *The New Times* and *The Literary Gazette*. He wrote, for example, and is proud of having done so, the first piece in Russian on Hemingway's *Old Man and the Sea*. He interviews visiting foreigners and he has published a book on the art of Paul Robeson. He also appears on television discussing literary and cultural matters.

We were sitting in the cafe of the National Hotel, overlooking the broad square of the old imperial riding school, the narrow strip of the Alexander Park and the lower walls of the Kremlin. The American National Exhibition in Sokolniki Park had been open to the public two days. I was interested in Gorokhov's response partly because he had reached so firm a conclusion so quickly, partly because his conclusion pretty well tallied with my own impressions of the USSR Exhibition in New York, which I had seen about two weeks earlier.

As things turned out, Gorokhov's conclusions about the Moscow show were not as absolute as he made them sound. He liked the fashion show, for example, very much indeed. Why? "Because the presentation is friendly and smiling, democratic in contrast to French and Italian presentations." The clothes themselves he had hardly noticed. It was the style, not the styles, that got him.

He liked also the geodesic dome that is the architectural symbol of the whole show and hoped that its presence in the Park after the exhibition closes will have some effect on Soviet architecture. Any good-willed visitor to Moscow must join in that hope. In the heart of town you come across the city's one example of clean, uncluttered lines and you learn that the building was designed and built 25 years ago by Le Corbusier. More recent buildings of size—the Ukrainia and Leningrad Hotels and a few ministries—are dull skyscrapers with wedding-cake embellishments of dummy towers, urns a storey high and great concrete stars haloed in concrete laurel wreaths. The sweet new style of oriental-ornamental is most familiar to Americans in the architectural fancies of Saul Steinberg, but it also bears a resemblance to the Tribune Tower in Chicago.

The main show within the dome also impressed Gorokhov "as a form, mind you, as a form." It impressed me as a form, too. What the form is is an arrangement of seven screens on the curving wall of the dome. On the screens appears a sequence of pictures, often the same on all seven, sometimes different, but always related to one particular point of a fast moving visual essay. Both color and black-white photographs are used in the Moscow presentation and still photographs occasionally give way to a brief run of movie on one or more of the screens. The show begins with a commentary in Russian, but this rapidly fades out beneath a Coplandesque score of illustrative music.

The show opens with twinkling images of the constellations and the observation, in Russian, that the heavens are the same for all nationalities. The thought is extended to include various universal terrain features. Mountains, plains, rivers and forests are also without nationality. Differences begin in the uses people make of the earth, in the ways they live their lives. The essay then takes up the American days and ways. People get up and have breakfast. Husbands kiss their wives and leave for work. Children go to school. We follow the men to the city. Brilliantly selected visual details weld together the commuter, the strap-hanger and the girl walking down Fifth Avenue. The cars come out of the garages and take to the great highway. Cities appear in silhouette, in details, from above, from within. The tempo of the changing images echoes the tempo of the urban life as conceived by the producers. Steel plants are visited; so are supermarkets and department stores. Families gather for the evening meal. Families gather for their evening television or scatter to the movies, the theater, nightclubs. Neon and jazz sparkle across the screens. On Sundays the people go to all varieties of religious institutions, including a Southwest Indian dance. The show ends with a vision of children being put to bed and going to sleep.

The subject may be peculiarly suitable for the seven screen form devised by Eames, but the overall effect

---

FRANK GETLEIN, *the art critic of* The New Republic, *has just returned from Moscow. This is the second of his articles on the exchange of exhibitions between the US and the USSR.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

on the beholder was certainly successful. You were caught up into the insistent rhythm of the American Way. You recognized that, almost by definition, the essay was superficial and more than a little propagandistic, but still you found those surfaces attractive, those rhythms compelling.

From the dome, the visitor moved to the accordion-pleat roofed arc of the main exhibition hall, where the accoutrements of American life were on display. Again, as in the Eames visuals, the effect was of a vast cornucopia spilling its treasures in a heap. This effect was modified and held in order by the open, two-storey grid system within the glass walls. Shoes, lingerie, outer-clothing, electrical appliances, toys and books all seemed to mount in unlimited abundance within the grid. The paintings and sculptures, on one end of the upper level, reflected the tremendous diversity of American art. At the opening of the exhibition I was standing at one end of the art show as the official party approached. The wave of photographers backed into the exhibition space and Nixon abruptly turned the party away, downstairs, avoiding both art discussions with Khrushchev and comparisons between his own views on art and those of the President.

This building full of consumer goods was geographically the heart of the whole show. It was also the focus of most Russian commentary. The building was augmented by a model home of the development type, by a stand dispensing free Pepsi-Cola, by a number of late model automobiles and boats, by a 360-degree movie from Walt Disney, by a large, entirely photographic show of American architecture, by the fashion show and by the "Family of Man" photo exhibition.

Unlike most Soviet citizens I talked with, Gorokhov was unimpressed even by the "Family of Man." The photography was good, he granted, but "the pictures are not optimistic enough to characterize human destiny. There are too many photographs of funerals. There should be more explication." The desire for more explication Gorokhov expressed at almost everything in the show. The lack of elaboration particularly depressed him in the architectural section. "Nothing but photos of the outsides of big buildings. No details of construction. No samples of prefabricated units for housing. Nothing from which we could learn something."

I felt we were getting close to the sharp differences I had noted myself between the Soviet show in New York and our own in Moscow.

"You say, in effect, 'We have such cars, we have such nylon shirts.' But this is not new. We in the USSR already know you have these things. We are getting them ourselves. In seven years we will have them all. Besides, even if it is true that some American workers do have such things, why, tomorrow another business cycle will come along and take it all away. Whereas in the USSR progress is steady and assured. Your exhibition will strike the Soviet people, but it will not convince them. You are the country of free enterprise. This needs explication. We expected it and do not see it. What are the advantages of free enterprise? What does it offer?"

My companion's words, not surprisingly, echoed the remarks of Khrushchev about the exhibition and anticipated the pattern of Soviet journalism in the next few days. The papers carried remarkably little straight description of the show. Rather, articles were used to make two points about the abundance of American consumer goods: it isn't true and anyway the USSR already has or soon will have everything shown.

You got the impression, finally, that the Soviet government was actually worried about the effect of the show on those who saw it. This worry became quite explicit in the case of the book show. The book section, put together by representatives of the American publishing industry, had already been combed out at Helsinki by American officials of the exhibition, who eliminated titles they thought would prove offensive to the host nation. When the crates were unpacked in Moscow, the Russian workers and observers immediately began thumbing through the books and almost as immediately came a Soviet request for the withdrawal of 42 titles, which, at this writing, have not been made public. The list was subsequently expanded to about 100 books unacceptable to the Ministry of Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. The books were temporarily withdrawn, pending a decision by the show's management and/or the State Department as to how firm a line should be taken. The best known title among the banned books is, of course, *The World Almanac,* but other large categories of objectionable books are even more significant. One such category is all books in the Russian language. The two other big ones are books in Hebrew and books about Israel.

Taking turns became necessary at the art show immediately. While Nixon and Khrushchev passed up the paintings, the Soviet public did not. Along with many of the Americans on hand in Moscow, I had pitched in during the last feverish days before the opening and during the first day I spent some time keeping people back from the paintings. The Soviet government had demanded of the exhibition management that "guest books" for comments be installed. The management refused, explaining that it was not an American custom and that it would create enormous traffic control problems in an already over-burdened layout. The art exhibition alone, for the first few days, did have a visitor's book. From its pages and from my service as a picture-protector, I got some idea of Russian reaction to the show.

The paintings alarmed the visitors. A lot of them failed as completely as Eisenhower to understand why

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

a painter should poke fun at generals. Abstract expressionism was found simply baffling and I frequently found myself in the irritating position of explaining and defending the work of Motherwell and De Kooning. The Jackson Pollock provoked astonishment that anyone would paint that way, but the real shocker in the show for most Russian visitors was the big Reginald Marsh "Steeplechase Park." Visitors were taken aback at all the casual semi-nudity. Similar objections were made about the Lachaise "Standing Woman." To many of the Russians, any distortion of the human form was something akin to blasphemy. On the other hand, the straightforward presentation of reality observed was often offensive, too. What is expected by the Russian viewer of paintings is an idealized, uplifting, comforting assurance that all is for the best in this best of all possible worlds. The Curry "Wisconsin Landscape" was quite possibly the most popular picture in the show. The big painting doesn't idealize but it does present a very attractive piece of countryside.

ACTUALLY, when you get right down to it, the art section of the show is the only section that does not follow the general Russian approach of the upbeat. On the spot in Moscow, after talking to Russian writers and their junior models of Intourist personnel, I found this critical attitude in the art section a value I hadn't even suspected in New York. For the impact of the show as a whole is a direct contradiction to everything the Moscow citizen reads, hears and sees about America The day the show opened, *Pravda* featured a photograph of an alley in a New York slum accompanied by a brief item on the number of Americans now dwelling in slums. This kind of information is at first glance utterly irreconcilable to the bright and opulent image given by the total exhibition. The paintings, with their weight on the side of urban life closely observed, may have bridged the gap for some visitors.

And on reflection some Moscow visitors may have come to conclusions about progress somewhat different from both the overall implication of the show and the quite specific antidotes prescribed by Khrushchev, the Soviet press and my friend Gorokhov. The only American self-criticism in the show occurs in the art section. The rest of it is much like Soviet painting: "All is for the best in this best of all possible worlds." Furthermore the art section is the best illustration in the park of the sheer diversity that is an American virtue.

The complete range of American painting in our time is covered and it is a wide range. It is fatuous to assume that change means progress, but anyone even mildly interested in painting can see in Moscow that Americans have explored many different ways of painting. For Soviet art, there is only one way, Socialist Realism—a misnomer, the art in question is Booster Idealism. The rooms of Soviet art at the Tretiakov Gallery in Moscow are accurately represented by the paintings at the USSR show in New York. The message comes across at once and as soon as it does the painting has delivered all it has. In the American paintings in Sokolniki Park, there is endless variety and within single paintings there is endless opening up of new levels of comprehension.

These points were not lost on some Russians, particularly some young art students and some older critics. For some years there has been a semi-underground "abstract" movement among Moscow artists. The American show is a kind of rallying point for them. They are learning a lot from the show and they have the hope that their countrymen will learn, too. Russian work that does not conform to Socialist Realism is not persecuted in the USSR. It is simply not bought by the government apparatus that supplies public buildings, including hotels, art museums and sale galleries. One "abstract" artist is an architect by profession. He paints on the side. Others are artists of the establishment who turn out their quota of inspiring painting and save some time for work on their own. It is not difficult for Moscow artists to get in touch with the sources of modern art in the West. The Pushkin museum has an intoxicating spread of Impressionism, Gauguin, Cézanne and the youthful Picasso and Matisse. Unfortunately, it is much too early for a Western visitor to make even a brief evaluation of the extent and accomplishment of the abstract movement in Moscow art. But it does exist, and it is pleased at the American paintings and sculpture.

For an American to be arguing for the rights and the virtues of abstraction gives him the feeling of having been hurled backward in time. This feeling is produced by many aspects of life in the Soviet capital and the feeling was accurately transported to the Soviet Exhibition in New York.

The feeling was inescapable among the paintings. Without exception the works lauded the leaders and presented a simple-minded view of life. The show as a whole stressed big, heavy achievement in the fields of industry, agriculture and applied science. The show reminded you of nothing so much as the vast Expositions throughout the Midwest around the turn of the century in which science and industry were presented as having solved the problems of mankind. The Russian Exhibition took the same view of science and industry. The huge model of Moscow University resembled, as does the original, the exposition buildings in St. Louis and Chicago and elsewhere, which have since become permanent parts of their communities. Had George F. Babbitt not been destroyed by the flood, he would have found sympathy of soul in present day Soviet Boosterism. Indeed in the isolated instances of surviving Babbitts, the sympathy is immediate. The loudest protests made at the art show in Moscow came not from Russians but from an

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

American businessman as indignant as any Communist at what our artists had done to his idealized notion of life. All of the undoubted Soviet achievement shown in New York fits into one plan or another, especially into the present seven-year plan, a word that returns us at once to the National Hotel and to Victor Gorokhov.

"Where is your plan?" he kept asking me. "I see no plan in all this. The whole exhibition appeals only to bourgeois interests. Our exhibition in New York speaks of the future, of sputnik and exploring the cosmos. You speak of today. We speak of tomorrow. Your whole emphasis is on color, shape, comfort. We are more interested in the spirit behind things."

I didn't answer him because I knew what he wanted and it wasn't there, either at the Exhibition or in American life as I know it. We have no plan, really. On the contrary, individuals and groups of individuals have their own plans, some of which inevitably conflict with the plans of others. What we seek as a society is not so much an overall plan as a set of conditions in which private planning is possible.

What he said about the spiritual element was largely true, too. Spirituality was all over the Soviet show in New York, proclaimed in large letters and in an illustrated ramp of social evolution. And spirituality was largely absent from the American show in Moscow. The spiritual was assumed to be a private matter, not a social matter. This concept never looked better than when viewed from the spiritualized materialism of the USSR, both at home and on parade in New York. The American show is almost completely materialistic; the objection has been made by American ecclesiastics as well as by Communist critics like Gorokhov. But this kind of materialism is a peculiarly American value that has emerged only in the last generation. At the time of the expositions in the Midwest, there was plenty of spirituality in American materialism, as Russian materialism today is loaded with spiritual overtones. The "bourgeois" life represented by the creature comforts in the American show can assuredly be a stultifying thing; manifestly television has the power of cretinizing the masses; no less is that power held by electronic living. Still, all these things are presented in Moscow as mere means; one may use them or not; one may use them without subscribing to any implied way of life. They are conveniences. In the new Soviet seven-year plan these creature comforts, whether enjoyed or not, take on the religious aspect they held for the American Boosters and Babbitts of yore.

THE STATE OF THE UNIONS—VI

The Role and Training of Leaders

by WARNER BLOOMBERG, JR., JOEL SEIDMAN and VICTOR HOFFMANN

NOT LONG AGO, a middle-sized industrial union held an institute in Washington, D. C. It brought local leaders into touch with political as well as labor notables. They watched Congress at work and met various Representatives and Senators, including Estes Kefauver, whose popularity in the shops is still very strong. George Meany spent a great deal of time with them. Walter Reuther, who happened to be in Washington, also saw the delegates briefly and shook hands all around. And when a staff man later asked what was the highlight of the entire institute, a majority said the short visit with the president of the Auto Workers. "Reuther seems to have an ability to articulate their beliefs," said the staff man, "or to make them feel that what he articulates is what they believe. One fellow wouldn't even wash his hands the rest of the day after the Reuther handshake!"

The UAW president has managed to do what other leaders so often fail to do. He *connects*. He personalizes for many union members, outside as well as within the Auto Workers (where there are some lively anti-Reuther segments), a unionism they can *believe in*. Philip Murray did the same among the Steelworkers, and it is only in recent years that the magnetism of John L. Lewis has lost much of its power to attract and hold outside the coal fields.

It is difficult to assess the sources of Reuther's appeal. It may be that in an industrial world full of complexities —seniority, automation, time studies, contract legalisms and the intricate systems of unemployment benefits and other fringe benefits—Reuther's simple inspirationalism gives a man something he can get hold of. That "something," ironically, has come to bore and even anger many top union leaders: "If I have to listen to Walter's 'Great Oration' on peace, leisure and prosperity one more time, I'll move to have him muzzled!" Another official was

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

heard to say that, "Reuther hasn't said one damn thing that was new in four years."

Nevertheless, all but the most irrational anti-Reutherites admit, however begrudgingly, that the ability to inspire makes for loyalty. When the check-off of dues was suspended during the last negotiations in the auto industry, during the contractless interim while work continued some company executives expected the UAW members would go on a dues-strike. But the voluntary collection of union dues proved to be almost as effective, if a good deal less convenient, as automatic deductions from paychecks.

Far more lies behind this loyalty on the part of Auto Worker members than the image of Walter Reuther. This union has been in the forefront in educating officers and members. It has kept the highest level of internal integrity. Its submission of contract settlements to referendum and the board of review it recently set up to safeguard members' rights reflect a deep commitment to democratic procedures and values. The same commitment has kept salaries for union officials and staff personnel well below that of many comparable unions.

To the extent that a union is democratically run, the leaders' ability to generate loyalty and solidarity among the rank and file will have visible results. Lack of that somewhat mysterious ability makes the position of David J. McDonald as Steelworker president insecure, in spite of what seems to be increasingly entrenched support for him among local and middle echelon officers. Many who backed McDonald in the last Steelworker election did so only because they considered his opponent an incompetent opportunist running on an emotionally appealing but fake issue (the dues increase). "Some men have it and some don't," the president of a large local in the East says. "McDonald doesn't. Do you know what I mean? Murray came across. Murray had it. McDonald is the office boy type. I think any really popular and well-known leader in steel could beat him. He's going to have a hard time staying president."

Staying on Top

THE WIDESPREAD DISCONTENT with McDonald's leadership is not based upon any failure of McDonald to "deliver" for the union. An official in the Midwest says that McDonald is a "great administrator who projects plans far into the future. Frankly, the union's gains under him in every respect—contracts, education programs, research, all of it—have been greater than when we had Murray. He's entitled to his $50,000 a year. Look at what the corporation executives he faces make!" But of McDonald's impassioned speech to the convention on behalf of his own pay raise, this partisan of the Steelworkers' president remarked with a pained expression: "I wish he hadn't done that. But look, how often do you get a great human being like Murray?"

Substantial powers are concentrated in the top offices of most unions. Yet few unions are as highly bureaucratized as many departments of the national government or of private corporations. The personal qualities of those at the top of the union hierarchy are likely to be recognized throughout the structure. Where Murray, secure in his position, might have indignantly viewed an opposition faction as *lese majesté*, McDonald appears to react almost with panic. Throughout the Steelworkers, he is thought of as intensely self-centered. As a middle echelon official (not an opponent of McDonald's) puts it, "He has to have everyone's adulation. Part of our trouble is that Steelworkers aren't inclined to fall down on their knees and hero-worship, but that's what Dave wants us to do for him."

The problem of how to stay in office is every union executive's problem. But with McDonald, given his personal insecurity, the problem is worse. Where could he go if he were displaced? To return to the shop after years of high pay, expense accounts, an office and secretaries is unthinkable even for officers who started as millworkers. Nor is the union man like the displaced corporate executive who may move into another executive position. Staff employees in research or education departments often do shift over to private industry or into professional education or government. But where would a Meany, a Hoffa, a McDonald, or even a Reuther go if pushed out of office? Not to another union. Unless, of course, he went over to "the other side" as a management employee in industrial relations.

The need to preserve jobs was one of the major "sticking points" in pushing through the AFL-CIO merger on every level. The problem has never been better illustrated than in the story of what happened when the United Packinghouse Workers and the Amalgamated

---

THIS IS the sixth of a series of articles examining the American labor movement since the merger.

MR. BLOOMBERG, once an hourly-paid employee in a half-dozen different factories, is now Assistant Professor of Sociology at Syracuse University and a contributor to *Harper's, The Reporter* and *Commentary*.

MR. HOFFMANN, once an agricultural laborer and canning factory employee, is now Associate Professor of Government at Valparaiso University in Indiana and contributes articles to *The Lutheran Quarterly* and *The Cresset*.

MR. SEIDMAN, who has been an organizer and labor education worker, is now Professor of Industrial Relations in the School of Business at the University of Chicago and has written many studies of union leadership and union democracy including *Union Rights and Union Duties*.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen tried to get together. The Meat Cutters have their roots in craft unionism, although they now have organized many plants on an industrial basis. They are usually conservative. The Packinghouse Workers were born out of the CIO explosion and the "radical" atmosphere of the thirties. For a number of years they had a strong Communist element, and they are still considered "left-wing" in the spectrum of American unionism. They are militant, socially aware, and internally one of the most democratic of unions. Their membership is a polyglot of races and nationalities, often poorly educated; their president, Ralph Helstein, is a lawyer and one of organized labor's "intellectuals." The Meat Cutters, like many former AFL unions, has had a strong executive and a relatively placid rank and file with only an occasional militant or radical lower or middle echelon leader. Patrick Gorman, Meat Cutters' secretary-treasurer, has been a "strong" administrator who ran the organization in terms of what he personally considered its best interests, though his own views have been quite progressive on many issues.

In the packing industry the two unions found that separation limited bargaining effectiveness, since it permitted leading employers to play one union against the other. Constant raiding and rivalry in organizing likewise sapped the strength of both groups, without changing the balance of power between them. As a result, cooperation in bargaining developed, culminating in a no-raiding and mutual assistance pact in 1953, despite beliefs on the part of the UPWA that the Meat Cutters were too "soft" in bargaining and suspicion on the other side that the more militant Packinghouse Workers still harbored Communist influence. Although there was agreement on both sides that merger was desirable, it could not be considered seriously so long as the AFL and CIO were separate, since neither union would consider breaking off its traditional affiliation.

The AFL-CIO merger in December, 1955, cleared the way for serious negotiations between the two unions. They were within an inch of success (tentative agreement had been reached on all issues and a joint convention was scheduled for October, 1956, to ratify the merger) when last minute obstacles arose. The disputes were over the choice of department heads, over whether all department heads should be vice presidents, and over the power of the executive officers over department heads.

These issues, though seemingly of less importance than differences earlier reconciled, led the Meat Cutters to call the marriage off. Their walk-out action can best be explained on two grounds: (1) lack of faith in the good faith of the Packinghouse Workers' leadership; and (2) the fact that contracts with the leading packers had just been signed, making each union secure from raids for a three-year period and removing temporarily the need for joint bargaining efforts. Now that the agreements are soon to expire the need for joint action has again developed, and key persons on both sides expect merger to be achieved in the relatively near future. But the problems of jobs and the distribution of power among a new joint leadership will still have to be resolved. And then only time will tell whether the spirit and leadership qualities of one or the other of the two unions will dominate.

Recruiting New Leaders

EXCEPTING a minority of more progressive unions, little has been done to develop new leadership at intermediate levels in the union hierarchy—before or since the merger. Most unions rely mainly upon experience on the job and in local union offices—steward, grievance committeeman or local administration—to prepare a man for the position of business agent or international representative. In the same way a full-time local or district official, after adequate "on-the-job" training, is a potential candidate for regional or national office. In some unions (some of the building trades) there is little officer turnover and a good deal of nepotism throughout. In most of the mass production industries this is less true, perhaps because many of the individuals who reach top local offices or higher are "upward mobile" enough to want their kin among the coming generation to move out of the hourly-paid category into technical, business or professional occupations.

But absence of nepotism and the formalities of democratic elections do not necessarily produce a turnover in local officers. Although they face regular elections by secret ballot, local leadership in the Machinists is fairly stable. They have no special program for developing leaders, though efforts are made to attract outstanding members of local unions in the classes and institutes which are available, these dealing largely with fairly narrow trade union matters. Matt DeMore, district 54 Machinist president, points out that "leadership comes out of the district meetings. This is a policy-making body and your strong leadership potential tends to show up there. About half of those who attend the district meeting, sometimes more, are already local officers; but we get active members who are on committees and the like involved also." The Machinists seem reasonably happy with the way this system operates to recruit new leadership.

The Rubber Workers have a more extensive educational program than the Machinists, and for good reason: One staff man estimates that close to half the local officers change every two years. Sometimes a "factional game of musical chairs" is played with essentially the same officers replacing each other from time to time, and one result of this is that local leaders accumulate a considerable educational experience of the more formal sort (most participants in institutes and conferences have their way paid by the local unions and thus are in effect delegates—often the officers themselves). But where en-

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tirely new men keep turning up, education by recurring attendance at such events as summer institutes is impossible. Too much turn-over thus has its negative side: short-lived leadership makes long-range planning almost impossible.

A group of staff men at the regional UAW office in Cleveland discussed this question of union leadership with a visible air of confidence. They think they have solved most of the problems of any importance. While the local union elects or appoints participants in educational conferences and institutes, it is seldom the officers who go. "They've already been to the basic classes," he added. "They go *before* they become officers." By providing training to active members who are not in officer positions the UAW continuously enlarges its supply of potential leaders.

The ILGWU Way

PERHAPS the most interesting and ambitious experiment in finding and training union personnel is the Training Institute that the ILGWU has conducted since 1951 to prepare young people for full-time positions. Each year the Institute puts between 20 and 30 young people, some from the shops or from ILGWU families, some with college backgrounds and some not, through an intensive 12-month course consisting of six months of class work at headquarters and two three-month periods outside, assisting local union officers or participating in organizing drives. The union frankly and publicly says it is looking for recruits—"the kind of dedicated and ethical leadership that will make the American labor movement the creative social force it seeks to be." Almost $100,000 yearly goes into the program, much of it to meet the living expenses of the trainees while in the field. The ILGWU, which guarantees jobs on its staff to those who complete the course satisfactorily, now has 98 graduates or about two-thirds of the total number on its payroll. Of these 40 are business agents and 25 are organizers; others are local managers, assistant managers or education directors.

Since 1937, the ILGWU has also operated officers' qualification courses, which applicants for paid office must complete before they are eligible to run.

If the ILGWU is ahead of other unions in leadership training, it also has an especially acute need. Most members of the union are women, typically with limited education, who do not expect to remain permanently in the industry and who in any event do not regard union office as a career. They tend to welcome men who are willing to come into their locals to speak for them. Among the locals of skilled men, such as the cutters in New York City, the situation is entirely different; here there is an active internal political life, with many aspirants for every local union post.

In the ILGWU as a whole the old leadership is rapidly dying off; only a limited number of qualified replacements are available. Also, there has been a shift in the ethnic composition of the industry's work force with the virtual disappearance of the idealistic Jewish immigrant, often trained in the socialist movement.

Gus Tyler, the relatively young and highly energetic director of the ILGWU Training Institute, argues that this kind of program has wide applicability to all organized labor and that a large body of "professionals" with expert skills is needed throughout the AFL-CIO to carry out democratically and effectively established programs. "The best method for obtaining leadership of this caliber," Tyler suggests, "is a system of selection, training, testing, maturing and promotion that combines the best features of West Point, a theological seminary and ward politics."

But such a venture would require the collaboration and commitment of at least several major unions. There is one precedent for such collaboration in the Union Leadership Academy, now in its fourth year of operation. It is conducted by three universities, Rutgers, Cornell and Penn State, in cooperation with six international unions. The "students" study the theory and practice of unionism. what causes recessions, full employment proposals and how to conduct local union classes.

There is not much prospect, however, that such modest undertakings will be expanded to approximate Tyler's suggestion. Not only are unions shy of such large-scale proposals because of their desire to retain their own particular (and not too expensive) training programs; there also is great variation in the extent and type of training for which they feel any need at all. For example, the 75-year old Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the Brotherhood of Firemen and Enginemen have for the first time undertaken to establish formal education programs. Following the usual pattern, the Trainmen have begun with "bread and butter" courses dealing with the Railway Labor Act, the Hours of Service Act, the Railroad Retirement Act, and unemployment provisions, plus sections on parliamentary law, public speaking and negotiating procedures under the RLA. As with most unions, the interest of these railroad crafts in education has arisen from their immediate, practical needs rather than from doctrine: The old tradition of railroading as a family occupation has been disappearing at the same time that the impact of technological change continues to alter the nature of railroad work and of bargaining—in 30 years employment in the industry has dropped from 2.5 million to less than 850,000.

All such programs, whether modest or ambitious, are an admission that simple participation in local union affairs is not preparation enough for the responsibilities of union leadership. And it is increasingly accepted doctrine that service as a local officer, while useful, perhaps essential, is not sufficient preparation for higher positions.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Here and there among labor leaders the failure of local meetings to educate members in union affairs has led to suggestions for some innovations. For example, groups within the union with common problems (say, those from one shift in a section of a factory) may elect a representative (whom they could recall under proper procedures); the local meeting would be made up of these representatives; other members could attend and observe, but those *elected* would carry on the debating and the voting, and their attendance would be required. Once or twice a year a general membership meeting would be called to set policy in the broadest sense. Each "representative" would have the job of keeping his constituents informed and of getting their ideas on issues on which positions would be taken from time to time.

Objections have been raised to such proposals. Under the present system, any individual (at least in unions which safeguard members' theoretical rights in practice) can gain the floor at a meeting and state his case. It is feared that a "representative" system would further divide and fragment a local's membership, increasing the possibility of factionalism. The union meeting is the one place where, at least potentially, members from different parts of a plant with different kinds of jobs can meet, greet and hear one another.

"Democracy Has Worked Against Us"

THEN there are those officials who are just plain cynical about the alleged merits of rank-and-file participation in union decision-making. One district staff man in a major industrial union says that in the development of the organization's educational program "democracy has worked against us. We have had to try to get the word around to locals not to let meetings elect the old hacks as delegates to institutes. The rank-and-file in too many places are willing just to send some popular old fellow or to allow participation to be a fringe benefit for those who hold office or are active on committees. We would probably get a better selection of younger members if we could have the local president pick half a dozen who are seldom or never even seen at local meetings." He argues that "union officers are elected to lead, not to follow, the rank and file," and he believes that learning to handle the somewhat haphazard local meeting attendance, large or small, in routine situations and in terms of crisis, is indeed "leadership training."

In brief, if we consider the whole of the AFL-CIO, little time and imagination are devoted to strengthening local union democracy. There isn't even a great deal of thoughtful speculation about the problem. A few rather unusual locals have managed to keep a relatively large number of members involved in meetings and activities. Others try to get a representative attendance by offering door prizes, showing movies, and even encouraging those who attend to be secretive about what went on—all to little or no avail. Others try by expanding the union's activities in recreation and community affairs to provide incentives that will attract members, and some of the best members and leaders have become active via the bowling team or a community chest drive. But the surface of the problem has barely been scratched.

(HOFFMANN: The union leader has been under a lot of contradictory pressures from the larger society, and especially from some of us who count ourselves as "friends of labor." We don't want labor leaders to be revolutionaries, but neither do we want them to be content with present social and economic institutions. We want them to look and sound as if they had the upbringing and education of their opposites in management—to have good public relations, but we don't want them to learn to yearn for fancy suites and high salaries. Why should union officials be expected to be the "saints" in a society in which preachers grow fat and ride around in Cadillacs, college professors worry about "what people will say," and most of us have one form or another of "promotionitis"? When so many people are trying to scramble up the ladder, perhaps the most important contribution the labor leader can make is to keep up the fight for the fellows on the lower rung.)

(BLOOMBERG: It's a truism that democracy in unions depends upon more than constitutions and by-laws. But some of us are becoming fearful that unions are confirming the "managerial pattern" of our society rather than creating an alternative to it—providing evidence for rather than against those who argue that the mass society is capable of only the most limited kind of self-government. A majority of unions would seem to confirm John Adams' dour view: that the rich become powerful and the powerful rich, while the great majority of "common" men either do not care or lack competence to do anything about it. But a Jeffersonian might still reply that pessimism about man's potentiality is not warranted until the optimistic assumptions of our democratic ideology are tested by application. Many union leaders avoid or evade such a test on the grounds that unions are organized as bargaining agents for workers, not as laboratories for political experiments.)

(SEIDMAN: It would be good if something were done to curb the high salaries, the unlimited expense accounts, and the general plush living of so many of the top union leaders, whose moral position as champions of the erstwhile underdogs is seriously compromised by their own self-indulgence. This is not to argue that high union leadership should be restricted to ascetics, but that unionism needs to be a social movement with some idealism, not just the "union business" of which Hoffa speaks. Those who are in it just for the money should be encouraged to leave for fatter paychecks elsewhere. Despite the loss of their bargaining skill, unions in the long run are better off without officers who are concerned more with personal financial gain than with achieving social objectives. Without them it might be more possible for the merged movement, having joined the more conservative outlook of predominantly craft unions to the broader social vision of industrial unionism, to recapture something of the idealism on which the labor movement was built.)

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

INDIA, PAKISTAN AND THE US—II

Cost of a Mistake

by SELIG S. HARRISON

LOOKING back on US global policy in the aftermath of Korea, one must conclude that any judgment on the decision to give military aid to Pakistan is in effect a broader judgment on the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), the Baghdad Pact, and indeed the entire Dulles policy outside Europe. But in this particular case it is important to bear in mind, as we have seen, that "pactomania" had its origins in the Empire League line of thought which so blithely expunged a "Middle Eastern" Pakistan from the map of the Indian subcontinent. The explanation of the Pakistan aid decision offered by *New York Times* military analyst Hanson Baldwin could have come straight from Sir Olaf Caroe's *Wells of Power*. "The problem which the Pakistan arms aid program is intended to relieve," he wrote on December 22, 1953,

> . . . stems chiefly from the decline in power of the British Empire. . . . British power, exercised largely by the British-led Indian Army, once dominated the entire strategic arc from Suez and the Persian Gulf eastward to Burma and Malaya . . . But the post-war rise of nationalism in the Middle East and Asia, plus the increasing threat of Communism and Nehru's anti-Westernism, altered the entire strategic picture.

The Pakistan aid decision was made at a time when the developing military crisis in Indo-China raised the widespread fear that the US would sooner or later face a military showdown in Asia; it was on December 12, 1953, that the French retreated from Laichau to Dienbienphu. Thus it is not surprising that the military arguments for a US-Pakistan alliance should have seemed more important than they appear in retrospect. Even today, while one can question how much local forces have served as a deterrent (the decisive deterrent being Soviet fear of nuclear war), one cannot say that Pakistan's five and one-half modernized divisions have had no deterrent effect. The reality was well expressed by Paul H. Nitze when, confessing his difficulty in seeing "how the Baghdad Pact powers could contribute more than delay and harassment to a Russian drive," he nonetheless conceded that "even minor elements of local strength add their bit to the general deterrent to Russian ambition and adventurism."

But granting the possibility that US aid to Pakistan did contribute its intangible something to the "general deterrent," were there more solid military gains? One can only wonder what use Pakistan's new divisions would be in the event of Soviet aggression anywhere but against Pakistan itself. Many informed observers doubt very much whether Pathan and Punjabi troops, predominantly Sunni Moslems, would be deployed effectively for long in strange social surroundings—Shia Iran, to take an imminent example—even assuming that a Pakistani regiment could, as a matter of logistics, be transported far enough quickly enough. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, in a 1954 *Collier's* article praising the pact, pointed out that General Mohammed Musa, now Army Commander-in-Chief, did not envisage his troops fighting outside Pakistan. "Even with Turkey's assistance," wrote Mowrer,

> . . . Pakistan could not (as General Musa admitted) prevent Communist land forces from advancing south and occupying the great Irani or Iraqi oil fields or the Suez Canal Zone. The oil fields and the canal can be defended by weaker forces against land attack from the north on only one line: the Zagros Mountains, which range northwest to southeast through Iran to Pakistan, with peaks as high as the Rockies. Just three major passes lead through the Zagros into Iraq. . . .

Given a crisis in which Pakistani troops were deployed elsewhere, the Soviets could easily stir up enough of a disturbance among the Pathans to tie down Pakistani forces on their own border. And if one imagines Russian troops themselves pouring down the Khyber Pass into the Northwest Frontier, the very last thing to do was to provide arms for Pakistan which, as events have shown, offered a pretext for intensified Soviet penetration of Afghanistan.

Most of the comprehensible military arguments heard today can be reduced to the fact that Pakistan serves as a kind of insurance in the event that we are denied in time of war other beachheads such as Turkey. In and

---

Associate Editor SELIG S. HARRISON *was Associated Press correspondent in India and Pakistan from 1951 to 1954. His forthcoming book* India—The Most Dangerous Decades *(Princeton University Press) is an assessment of the possibility of Balkanization in the post-Nehru period.*

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of itself, Pakistan does not appear to be, on the basis of many inquiries within our government, militarily vital to our security. A radar or communication intercept facility in one country receiving military aid gains in value in proportion to what we do or do not have at a given moment elsewhere. The same is true of a missile base or a runway big enough for jet bombers (which can be constructed with greater justification under military aid when the country has some jet bombers of its own—as Pakistan now does with our B-57's). The wartime use of airstrips so close to the new Soviet industrial centers beyond the Urals has no doubt been a major consideration from the start in the Pakistan aid program. In military terms, the "point of return" concept is translated into the life or death of American fliers who would brave wartime bombing missions into Russian territory. But here, too, the importance of Pakistan airstrips is marginal rather than crucial to strategic planning. Even at the time the program was launched, Hanson Baldwin wrote that air bases in Pakistan, while "desirable," were "not essential." The issue, therefore, comes down to whether marginal military advantages which would have their greatest value only in time of war should have been given priority over central and powerful political considerations.

☆

The political consequences of our military aid to Pakistan have been unfortunate not only in India but in Pakistan itself. In the case of India, what began as an emotional outburst has hardened into an enduring sense of injury. Most Indians did conclude, as Senator Fulbright warned, that military aid to Pakistan was essentially an anti-Nehru maneuver "designed to force his hand." The military necessity is so questionable and Pakistan's preoccupation with India so conspicuous that it makes sense to them only in these terms; they cannot seriously believe the great US simply blundered into a mistake. Phillips Talbot in his definitive Council on Foreign Relations study, *India and America*, while not making a judgment on the aid decision, reports "almost a stereotype in India of an America that is helping Pakistan out of a sense of hostility to India."

The prospect of unpopularity in India, as such, need not have been determining. But the impact on the balance of political forces within India, and thus on the possibility that India may escape domination by pro-Communists or Hindu xenophobes, is another matter having a clear bearing on long-range US security interests. The climate of opinion certain to result in India from a US military alignment with Pakistan could have had no effect other than to contribute to the growth of the Communist Party and the two major Hindu extremist groups, the Jan Sangh and Hindu Mahasabha parties. The highest officials of the US Embassy in late 1953 foresaw this and Ambassador George V. Allen in particular, for all of his circumspect propriety in public, so warned in his reports to Washington.

Although important local circumstances—as well as the general fact of poverty and consequent anti-government discontent endemic to less-developed countries—can be advanced to explain specific victories of both the Communists and the Hindu parties since 1954, the increase in anti-American, anti-Pakistan sentiment resulting from the military aid decision has greatly strengthened these forces nationally. In the five-state north Indian belt from Punjab on the west across the Gangetic heartland to Bengal, in which Pakistan-consciousness is strongest, the vote polled by the two Hindu parties for members of the lower house of Parliament jumped from 8.5 percent in 1952 to 15 percent in 1957. The Communists went from 3.3 percent of the national vote in 1950 to 8.8 percent in 1957, gaining for the first time in the pivotal north Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. ("You will drive awakening young Asians into the Communist camp by seeming to seek Asian manpower to fight your battles," Nehru told Mowrer). Nehru's Congress Party, meanwhile, remained relatively stationary—42 percent in 1952, 43 in 1957—with the losers in this right-left polarization being independents and the Socialists. The gain of the Hindu parties may seem small but it has been enough to give them political momentum out of all proportion to their numbers. Should the Hindu parties in future command, say, 25 percent of the north Indian electorate, the pressures on any Indian government for a tougher line on Pakistan will grow and the possibility of reconciliation will correspondingly decline.

For her part, as *The Observer* has declared, Pakistan "has felt encouraged by her military relationship with the United States to regard herself as 'the brave little Belgium' of the Indian subcontinent." And yet Pakistan's politically-conscious middle class has a world view virtually the same as India's. Professor Keith Callard of McGill University in his sympathetic study of Pakistan foreign policy points to what should be plain to any on-the-scene observer when he states that Pakistan "shares many of the preconceptions of those areas of Asia and Africa that have recently secured independence"—e.g. general acceptance of Lenin's theory that colonialism was economic imperialism, and the sentiment of "Asian, or perhaps non-white solidarity." With their Afro-Asian preconceptions, most of Pakistan's elite would have preferred to steer a more or less neutralist course, perhaps less pretentious and less anti-Western in tone than India's policy used to be but nonetheless a course of its own.

"Some nations who agree with us," said Chester Bowles recently in an obvious reference to Pakistan,

> . . . do not really agree with us. They agree with us out of necessity. They are so very close to the margin

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

> of survival that they have wrapped their arms around our neck in a desperate effort to be saved. They are ready to pay a price for it . Other nations, more proud perhaps, but more sure of themselves, more confident of what they have, are less likely to do that.

Pakistan threw her arms around us because for a country which was so clearly a poor economic and political risk, the only way to get substantial US economic support, let alone military aid, was as a committed cold war partner. This in spite of the fact, as Professor Callard notes, that Pakistan "had no strong convictions about the balance of righteousness between the West and the Communist powers . . . Before 1953, she wished to pick and choose." It was not Nehru but Liaquat Ali Khan who said in 1951 that "sometimes we agreed with the Western bloc, and sometimes with the Communist bloc, as the situation and the matter under consideration demanded."

ALTHOUGH India is subjected to continual criticism in the US press for her China policy, Pakistan, too, was one of the first nations to recognize the Peking regime. "In spite of her alliances with the West," said a study issued by the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Pakistan "has always had friendly feelings for the People's Republic of China." Madame Sun Yat Sen was received as a state guest in Karachi in 1956, and in June of 1957 the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister were scheduled to leave for Peking until US pressure forced cancellation of their tour. Former Prime Minister H. S. Suhrawardy did finally go to China in October, 1957, and Chou En-lai paid a return visit in December.

Since many Pakistanis rationalized their partial surrender of freedom of motion in foreign affairs as a means of getting support vis-a-vis India which the US, on its side, had no intention of giving, the alliance has never rested on a firm political base. It was conceived and negotiated, former Premier Suhrawardy wrote in *Foreign Affairs,* as

> . . . the business of a few ministers sheltered in secrecy. The result has been a set of commitments in the legal sense, yet not sufficiently felt as commitments in the consciousness of the people themselves. . . . The very secrecy with which our engagements have been entered into, the lack of public airing in debate, has left them vulnerable to suspicion that they have somehow rendered us subservient and have drained away our autonomy.

Mr. Suhrawardy's deliberate effort in 1956 to stage a parliamentary discussion of foreign policy and his barnstorming defense of the US alliance at the time of Suez represent the one notable attempt to remedy this situation.

David E. Bell, Secretary of the Littauer Graduate School at Harvard and supervisor for four years in Karachi of the Littauer Center's Advisory Group to the Pakistan Planning Board, testified before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on January 22 that while "the feeling of dependence is an uneasy one" in the case of all kinds of US aid,

> . . . this is a much stronger political weapon in the case of military aid than in the case of economic aid. The problem of defending their military alliance with the US is, it seems to me, an extremely serious one for the Pakistani politicians who believe in that alliance. . . . The fact that there is a military alliance and a military assistance program creates a political problem which is present all the time. It is no doubt very attractive to the ordinary Pakistani to see the Indians maintain a position which to us looks like neutralism, but to them looks like strong independence. For a Pakistani politician to defend the fact that he has not taken up a position like India but has instead joined himself to the United States, this is a hard thing for him to defend, and it seems to me that over a period of years one can doubt a little bit that it is always going to be defensible.

The prospect that it might in time have to be defended by a military regime at the point of a gun—a US gun—is not a pleasant one. Pakistan's sub-surface doubts about alignment with the US are especially acute in the case of the Bengali majority of her population which lacks even the limited consciousness of Middle East and Islamic-world ties which in a minor way differentiate West Pakistan's world view from that of India. "For many West Pakistanis," says Professor Callard, "the proof of loyalty is the violence of a man's antagonism to India and her leaders. East Pakistan on the other hand, preoccupied with her own backwardness, is apt to speculate on the advantages of closer ties with Calcutta and the Indian economy. There is a real difference in view toward the order of importance of various issues of foreign policy."



The essential weakness of the US in its relationship with Pakistan is that the alliance *was* "the business of a few ministers sheltered in secrecy." Charles Burton Marshall, adviser (1955 to 1957) to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and a former member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, points to General Ayub Khan's rise to power as a classic demonstration of "the perils . . . inherent in contracting with in-groups in politically underdeveloped states on the assumption that we are dealing with national governments really endowed with contractive capabilities." Once another government becomes a large-scale beneficiary of our aid, he writes in "Alliances With Fledgling States" in the recently published *Alliance Policy in the Cold War*,

> . . . we tend in some degree to invest prestige in it. If the receiving state has marked political weaknesses,

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

our giving of aid tends to plight us to the correction of its weaknesses.

And when we enter into contractual relations with a "government" which is really "a clique, an in-group,"

> . . . inevitably the tendency is to commit the prestige of the United States . . . to the fortunes and tenure of such an in-group. The recipient group will probably be fully aware of this, even if our own government does not adequately take heed of it at the moment of making commitment. The recipient regime may be able to make use of these factors so as to make its own necessitousness a source of advantage in the relationship. Moreover, commitment to an in-group in the guise of a government in the usual sense tends to foreclose the United States from interchange with rival potential in-groups. . . .

In time, this is to say, the tail wags the dog. Not the US but the recipient country—the "ally"—sets policy.

Pakistan began to do the wagging when the US became committed in 1954 not to supplying specific items, but to supporting certain units or "force goals." These were set forth in an *aide memoire* in language specific enough—*e.g.* the "modernization" of five and one-half divisions, "a squadron of medium bombers"—to mean something definite to General Ayub while having, in fact, a meaning broad enough to allow for years of bickering. When does "modernization" end in a period of changing weapons technology? Is a "division" the US Army unit or the *one-third* larger entity which the British fixed as the Indian Army standard in World War II? The ambiguity was aggravated by the expansive camaraderie of the US military men sent to Pakistan Army Headquarters in the crucial early stages of the aid program and the accompanying conviction on the part of Admiral Arthur W. Radford, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that nothing was too good for General Ayub. The 11-member survey mission which visited Pakistan in March, 1954, to plan the aid program was headed by Brigadier General Harry Meyers, who was called from another post, because, as a former military attaché in Karachi, he was an old friend of General Ayub's. The key Army section of the Military Assistance Advisory Group set up thereafter was directed by General Rothwell Brown, now retired, son of veteran Hearst writer George Rothwell Brown. Gen. Brown had lived in Karachi as a wartime tank officer in 1942; had commanded Pakistanis-to-be in the 14th Punjab Regiment in northern Burma, and outspokenly admired the new British-trained Pakistani officer corps (in the memory of a State Department official) as the kind of "top-notch soldiers who deserve top-notch equipment." Arriving in Pakistan, he found that on the little matter of what constituted a division the Pakistanis had some very definite ideas. General Ayub sat down soon after in Washington with Admiral Radford and the Joint Chiefs and got clearance for Army aid costing much more than Gen. Meyers' estimates (though not, it should be noted, as much as Pakistan asked for). When General Ayub has wanted to get this or that added to the program in recent years he has at times referred back to something said—*i.e.*, promised, as he took it—by Generals Meyers and Brown.

> SENATOR GORE: I find it difficult to defend giving a vast amount of military assistance to Pakistan and then providing economic aid to India with which she buys Canberra bombers. We are paying the bill on both sides.
>
> That is a little hard to defend, and I am raising this question not as an enemy of the program, but as one who has found the necessity of defending it on the stump, and it is awfully hard to defend.
>
> SECRETARY MCELROY: This defense, of course, is not against India. This is allocated to Pakistan for defense against Russia and China.
>
> SENATOR GORE: Well, that may be your purpose, but our official who is there with the program day to day says that insofar as the Pakistanis are concerned, they want it as armament against India.
>
> SECRETARY MCELROY: Well, we don't agree with them.
>
> SENATOR GORE: But you give it to them, nevertheless, and they are the ones who will use it, not you.
>
> *Senate Foreign Relations Committee*
> *May 6, 1959.*

WHAT was initially budgeted on the eve of the survey mission's departure as a $25 million program and then grew, on its return, to $171 million has now passed $522 million in hardware alone (*i.e.* excluding "defense support" and other economic aid not directly tied to the military buildup which round out the $1.5 billion aid total for Pakistan). The files of *The New York Times* in 1955 show a whole series of dispatches from Karachi correspondent John F. Callahan reporting the bitter complaints of "high military sources"—General Ayub, as it happens—charging that the US was backing down on its generals' promises. There were flying visits to smooth things over by Admiral Radford (who had received one letter from General Ayub protesting "this nuts and bolts" US aid) and by retired General James Van Fleet.

By March, 1958, Prime Minister Feroz Khan Noon was addressing himself publicly to possibilities that a disenchanted US might avoid new commitments beyond those covered in the 1954 *aide memoire*. "I hear rumblings," he told the now-dissolved Parliament,

> . . . that from 1959 they probably want to stop our military aid. I am sure if they do that it will be under pressure from India. I can tell the world that if our people find their freedom threatened by India they will break all pacts to save freedom and will shake hands with those whom we have made our enemies for the sake of others.

In referring to enemies he had in mind specifically the

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

USSR, which had interposed a Kashmir veto on India's behalf in the Security Council on February 15, 1957. In any case, here was an explicit, on-the-record statement that Pakistan saw its collective security commitment as a sacrifice "for the sake of others"—and an astonishingly overt example of what George Kennan no doubt had in mind in his fifth Reith Lecture. "When suggestions are made to us," said Kennan, "that if aid of one sort or another is not forthcoming, people will, as the saying goes, 'go Communist,' surely there is only one answer: 'Very well then, go; our interests may suffer, but yours will suffer first.' "

Mr. Dulles, according to authoritative sources, was deeply angered by the Noon statement, and at this point the US was intent on slowing down the Pakistan program. At the instance of C. Douglas Dillon, who had recently been appointed Undersecretary of State for Economic Affairs, a Pentagon cost-study mission visited Pakistan in early 1958 to examine the effects of US military aid on the economy. The study had led to a decision to reduce aid levels in the 1959 fiscal year budget. But in a matter of months, the Kassem revolution in Iraq changed everything. Although General Ayub was not yet President of Pakistan, his was the effective power to blackmail. In the post-Iraq consternation in Washington it seemed easiest to accede to his claims once again. And when he did become President he pressed hard to prove he could command more from the US than had the ousted Iskander Mirza.

Thus the plain fact is that military aid to Pakistan, though conceived as an exercise in collective security, has degenerated into a sop to one of our "political clients." "The real reason why we give arms to Pakistan," Walter Lippmann wrote on April 28, 1959,

> . . . is to keep the Pakistan Army commanders friendly to the United States rather than to the Russians. It is an unhealthy pretense to plead that we are arming Pakistan in order that Pakistan may defend itself against a Soviet attack, or more far-fetched still that Pakistan could or would do anything substantial to defend Iran and Turkey if they were attacked.

In his June 27 defense of Pakistan's maintenance of an eight-division army (two-and-one-half divisions over the force goals covered by US military aid) following implied criticism in Congressional testimony by Defense Secretary McElroy, General Ayub said with an air of dismissal that "if our friends . . . think that they can lead us to confused thinking against hard facts of life, then we just cannot oblige."

It is interesting to speculate on the impact which the drift of US policy in the critical years of 1952 and 1953 must have had on the course of Indo-Pakistan relations. After the 1951 elections the relatively poor showing of the Hindu rightist parties had emboldened those in the Indian Government who saw the importance of a Kashmir settlement, and in India's post-election months of early 1952 Chester Bowles came remarkably close to negotiating Kashmir peace. At the time of UN mediator Frank Graham's March mission to the subcontinent, Bowles and the late Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, then Secretary-General of the Nehru Foreign Office, reached agreement on a variation of the often-discussed partition approach to the Kashmir dispute: Pakistan would get the Moslem majority Azad Kashmir territory on its side of the existing cease-fire line, India would retain Hindu and Buddhist-majority Jammu and Ladakh, and a plebiscite would be held in the Himalayan Vale of Kashmir. The key feature of this plan was that India would have insisted on retaining forces of only 18,000 during the plebiscite. But Graham was as scrupulous in respecting what he conceived to be the limits of his assignment as he was dedicated in his long quest for a Kashmir settlement. He felt that he had to remain within the united-Kashmir basis defined by the Security Council resolution under which he was operating, and he feared that if the Indians balked at the point of decision, he might, by venturing beyond his formal assignment, end his usefulness. Graham thus gave Pakistan a means for holding out in the hope of avoiding partition and the Bowles initiative died. Few of the parties concerned, however, dispute the fact that in early 1952 the prospects for a Kashmir settlement were better than at any other time. The chance still existed when Graham met secretly with the two sides at Geneva in September and in February, 1953.

During this period the domestic political conditions of the problem within India changed, however, and it is in the light of this change that one can see why the US aid negotiations may well have had the effect of stiffening the positions of both India and Pakistan. In early 1952 India was not afraid of a plebiscite: Sheikh Abdullah at the helm in Kashmir would deliver a pro-Indian result. But it was as 1952 progressed that Sheikh Abdullah began to act more than a little bit independent, describing his state Constituent Assembly as a "one hundred percent sovereign" body; making it clear that he would not accede, as the Hindu parties demanded, to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Parliament to Kashmir, and even throwing out hints that he did not rule out total autonomy, outside the Indian Union altogether, as a "Switzerland of Asia." Right-wing Hindu pressure for a showdown with Abdullah over "integration" with India and alleged discrimination against the state's non-Moslem minority must have given Nehru and his lieutenants second thoughts as early as mid-1952 about conceding loose terms for a plebiscite and indeed about the possibility of gambling on Abdullah as a "safe" political boss of the state after all.

Here one must recognize the sensitive connection of the Kashmir issue with internal stability in India. What may seem to be nothing but obduracy on Nehru's

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

part in an international dispute can be more accurately viewed in relation to Nehru's political position in India and to the fragile equilibrium of the Indian Union. On the one hand, as has often been observed, a vote by Kashmiri Moslems to go with Moslem-majority Pakistan would test the secular basis of the Indian state—exposing India's 40 million Moslems to Hindu extremists who would surely call them potential traitors and risking, possibly, a repetition of the 1947 massacre. But in addition a plebiscite lost would be an implicit invitation to some of the other restive regional outposts of the Union to demand greater autonomy. Nehru simply cannot admit that there are any open questions as to the map of India, any option for any part of India other than membership in a strong central state. If Kashmir's status remains to be settled, then nothing is settled, and India may succumb, so the nationalist fear runs, to a chain reaction of Balkanization.

In retrospect it seems fair to speculate that by mid-1952, for reasons of domestic politics, Nehru did not really want a Kashmir settlement—but, at the same time, may not have entirely ruled one out and, at any rate, recognized the necessity for going through the proper conciliatory motions. In response partly to official US encouragement, unofficially conveyed by a distinguished American, Nehru and Pakistan Premier Mohammed Ali conferred on Indo-Pakistan problems at London during Elizabeth's coronation in June, 1953, and again in Karachi in late July. The coup which resulted in Abdullah's arrest and the accession of Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed as Kashmir's premier came on August 9, less than two weeks after Nehru's return. But if the aid promise had become known to Mr. Nehru as early as September, 1952, as we have seen, it is reasonable to suppose that he was well aware he would soon have a pretext for postponing accommodation with Pakistan. After Abdullah was deposed and Mohammed Ali came to Delhi at Nehru's request in late August, India agreeably—too agreeably, in retrospect—put her signature to a May, 1954, deadline for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator. In the next three months the military aid pact was attacked as an act of bad faith, a Cold War intrusion, and Nehru refused to resume negotiations.

Pakistan, meanwhile, was banking on US military aid at the time of the Geneva negotiations on Kashmir in September, 1952, and by the February meeting the Eisenhower victory had further emboldened Karachi. Some among those who were at Geneva sensed a progressive stiffening in the position of the Pakistan negotiators as their expectations of increased bargaining power grew.

What chance there may have been for a Kashmir settlement in this period appears to have been directly damaged by the prospect of a military aid program. Thanks to US policy, the Indians and Pakistanis were each provided a rationale which made it easier to pursue narrow national self-interest. The US interest, however, lay then as it does today in furthering a modus vivendi. Is it too late? India has had ample opportunity during Abdullah's six-year confinement to knit Kashmir, in economic terms at least, to the Union, and Pakistan can confront India from a position of increased strength. But at the same time the increasingly dismal economic and political situation in both countries has led to a growing awareness of the need for minimizing economic wastage and political escapism—an awareness given point and urgency by the shock of Tibet and the Western financial offers leading to an Indus settlement.

The critical question is whether this awareness can be translated into practical action irrespective of a Kashmir settlement. Many Pakistanis are beginning to realize that in the wake of General Ayub's coup, as Charles Burton Marshall has observed, their case in the Kashmir dispute

> . . . has lost some force. The original juridic merits may remain unaffected, but the complaint about the tyranny of holding a people in military subjection and denying it the benefits of a constitutional government of its own choosing has lost edge.

They are understandably insistent that the US use its influence, as it should, to get India to the bargaining table. Still, they know this is easier said than done, and they tend to rationalize acquiescence in the status quo with self-assurances that post-Nehru political disarray in the subcontinent may give them some future chance to get Kashmir. Many Indians return the compliment by opposing concessions now in the hope that a weak Pakistan will in time become an Indian satellite.

Pakistan can with reason expect the US to apply leverage to India, just as India counts on the US to soften up Pakistan: the powers-that-be in both countries know that without large-scale US assistance they may not long remain the ruling powers. But the US can move sovereign governments so far and no further when their vital interests are at stake. In the case of India and Pakistan, US leverage is not likely to accomplish big things—it certainly cannot move India on the Kashmir issue—barring a radically revised approach to military aid. This basic reality must be reconciled by the Administration with the equally inescapable fact that the new order in Pakistan is a military order based on a US-equipped and trained Army which should, in the US interest, remain US-oriented. There is obviously a world of difference between what should have been done five or six years ago and what can now be done in a new set of circumstances. The article to follow will consider how the US can continue to supply the Pakistan Army and yet have a good-offices role in the search for Indo-Pakistan accommodation.

This is the second of three articles.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Superficial Aspect

Is a Yawn Coming On?

THEY SAY that one great trouble with Khrushchev is his abysmal ignorance of America and Americans; but when he announced that he doesn't want to look at any army installations because he comes as a peaceful man, not with a rocket in his pocket—well, with that he belted one clean over the centerfield fence. If he had made a lifelong study of Americans he couldn't have said anything better.

Perhaps, though, the commentators are right. It may be that Khrushchev spoke out of his knowledge, not of Americans, but Russians. If that is the case, it is another strong indication that Russians are people—a doctrine to be accepted hesitantly by anyone who dreads the accusation of being "soft on Communism," but nevertheless a doctrine supported by massive evidence. If Khrushchev, saying what he knew the masses in Russia would like to hear, hit upon something that the masses in America very much like to hear, the implications are immense.

For if we are alike in this, it is a reasonable assumption that we may be alike in other things. For instance, it may be that the Russians, too, are a horribly scared people, and if that is the case they must be appalled by the risk Khrushchev is taking in venturing into this country. As a matter of fact, judging by the superficial aspect of things, they are right. Any man who visits the haunts of the terrified is taking a serious risk, often a greater risk than one who goes among the vicious. The vicious, as long as they keep their wits about them, may be restrained by self-interest; but the utterly terrified are restrained by nothing. A badly scared visitor received by badly scared hosts is in a precarious position. If some American town proves to be another Caracas, no one need be surprised.

It is always possible, though, that the abject fright of this country is in considerable measure synthetic. That seems to be the case in Russia. At least the street crowds did not exhibit any notable fear of Vice President Nixon; on the contrary, they were consistently polite and in many places cordial. Politicians of the McCarthy type find terror a convenient means of garnering votes and they are adept at transforming reasonable misgivings into blind panic, or the appearance thereof. But when the thing is put to the test it frequently turns out that the common people were not half as scared as they had been told they were.

This is alarming to politicians whose political capital consists mainly, if not exclusively, of their ability to wave the Red flag as politicians of an earlier day waved the bloody shirt. If the head of the Russian government is received quietly in this country, goes where he wishes without molestation, and returns to Russia in perfect health, it is probable that these politicians will have to find a new issue; and few of them have brains and character enough to do so.

The ruin would be complete if, after an uneventful Russian visit, the American President's visit to Russia should be marked by nothing more sinister than the presentation of bunches of flowers by little girls. If that should happen, even the politicians could see that as a vote-getter "the Communist conspiracy" is no longer infallible.

The whole history of this republic attests that when it is no longer possible to stampede American voters by mere howling, the better class of men in public life have a chance to use their brains to settle issues in a reasonable way.

It is also historically true that the moment when the voters refuse to stampede usually comes suddenly, with no warning, and with no visible cause. It happened to McCarthyism. One day it appeared to be as invincible as ever, but the next day it was so dead that it wasn't even news. It happened to Palmer's witch-hunt after World War I. It happened to the Bloody Shirt shortly after 1885, when Kansans began to yawn as soon as Ingalls started to orate. It may be on the eve of happening to "the Communist conspiracy."

THIS is appalling to those politicians who have depended on the issue to hold their jobs, but nobody else need be alarmed. Certainly Communism will remain a menace, but its threat will not be increased when we stop screaming and begin to take intelligent measures to deal with it. War is not an intelligent measure; but what to substitute for war calls for careful thinking, probably continued for a long time; and it is pretty hard to do careful thinking in the midst of a convention of whirling dervishes.

So if we can restrain such elements as the Puerto Rican Nationalists who tried to liquidate Truman and did shoot up the House of Representatives, perhaps Mr. Khrushchev's visit may be productive of some good. Perhaps it may even work the miracle of producing an American yawn when the words "Communist conspiracy" are uttered.

GERALD W. JOHNSON

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS & COMMENT

The Worker as a Young Tough

by Irving Howe

FEW AMERICANS — Melville is the notable exception—have managed to write about workers without betraying condescension or designs. The English do it much better.

Why? A popular, Tocquevillian explanation has it that Americans are befogged by democratic sentiments and hence unable to see class realities, while the English, accepting the fact that they live in a hierarchical society, can look hard and long at the intricacies of social place. I would be inclined to stress another factor: American writers don't deal as much or as well with working-class life because the role often assigned to workers in English novels (the people of the *old neighborhood* whom the hero abandons) has been taken over in the American novel by immigrants. And then there is the fact that the English have such good models. Defoe, Dickens, Hardy, Lawrence and Bennett offer some tips as to the handling of character and setting, but more often and far more important, they provide a tradition of ease and assurance in approaching plebeian life.

Saturday Night and Sunday Morning
by Alan Sillitoe
(Knopf; $3.75)

Anyway, no matter what the reason, the English do it better. Recently they have also done a great deal more of it. During the post-war years, when a number of English writers have begun to feel an ambivalent tenderness toward their plebeian origins, working-class life has come to seem not only a subject full of vivid possibilities but also a standard from which to draw moral judgments about new styles of life in the welfare state.

Two recent novels, both attractive minor works, illustrate the success of English writers in dealing with the proletarian milieu and also provide a sharp contrast between the worker of half a century ago and the worker of today. Walter Allen's *Threescore and Ten* (reviewed by Graham Hughes, *NR*, June 29) is a sweet-tempered retrospect of the life of Billy Ashted, an English worker who at the turn of the century had educated himself to socialist convictions, a measure of intellectuality and most impressive of all, an enviable degree of civilized humaneness. Surely the socialist movement, for all its failures, has reason to feel that in nurturing such figures within the European working class it made a genuine contribution to humanity.

By contrast, Alan Sillitoe, a new English novelist, presents in *Saturday Night and Sunday Morning* a radically different kind of worker, one who has a great many ancestors in both life and literature but whose apparent typicality in our day, like his modest creature comforts, seems mainly due to the triumph of the welfare state. A rough and carefree young savage, Arthur Seaton lives for the pleasures of the moment; he has no interest in socialism or any other kind of politics, though when he goes back to the factory on black Monday mornings he does feel a vague surge of rebellion. Mr. Sillitoe is remarkably indulgent toward Arthur, but he does not romanticize his circumstances: the factory is still grim, the town still ugly.

Though not class conscious, at least not in the traditional Marxist sense, Arthur is probably more outspoken toward the factory foreman than the radical workers of Billy Ashted's generation dared to be. Quite free of the chapel puritanism which tormented the Ashteds, even as in other ways it drove them to selflessness and exaltation, Arthur bristles with sexual energy and manly cameraderie. As he reels from brawl to brawl, with regular intervals of bed-hopping, he seems decent enough in a rough sort of way and even perversely likeable.

Suppose Billy Ashted were to meet Arthur, what would he feel? He would certainly be proud at having helped make possible Arthur's security, for Mr. Sillitoe's mindless young hero is reaping the rewards of Billy's decades of street-speaking and door-to-door canvassing; but he would also, as a 19th Century disciple of the higher life, be horrified at Arthur's lack of culture, his indifference to ideas, his almost comic absence of religious or political zeal. Our world is full of Arthurs, both in the East and West, blokes who are just trying to get along. As a good-natured nihilist who is thoroughly the creature of recent history yet is totally cut off from it, Arthur reflects in his very exuberance the exhaustion of a century of causes.

The novel opens with a mammoth Saturday night binge and then quickly sets what is to be the dominant tone: a blend of comedy and nausea. With a paycheck in his pocket big enough to drink his way through the weekend—no need to fret about Mum and Dad, no wife to nag him, no children to feed—Arthur gets himself pickled but then makes a quick recovery and ends in bed with Brenda, the juicy yielding wife of another worker. So begins a cycle of carousing, fighting, love-making and running, sometimes softened by warm family scenes and other times coming to a bloody halt with streetbrawls.

ESSENTIALLY the novel is a series of vignettes, like a succession of movie stills without much continuity or climax. Its faint pretense of a plot rests on little more than Arthur's final decision to drop his wild-catting and accept the restraints of domesticity: life, he sees, catches up with everyone. Meanwhile Mr. Sillitoe draws some vivid pictures: Arthur sparring warily with his foreman and going through a series of elaborate gestures to deceive the "rate-checker"; Brenda calmly having herself an abortion in a steaming bath while Arthur sits by, as if he'd dropped in for a cup of tea.

There are nice bits of horseplay too. When Arthur becomes annoyed at the nosiness of his neighbor Mrs. Bull, he relieves his anger by peppering her rear with an air-gun. The lady sends her meek husband to revenge her honor and he, poor duck, sidles up to Arthur's doorstep and mumbles, "Ar've 'eerd yer've been shootin' at my missis."

But for all of Arthur's energy, his life

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

is sadly limited in scope and value. It is a life bound by ritualistic practice and unexamined assumption, for in the absence of genuine consciousness, his freedom comes to little more than a repetition of familiar acts with increasing violence. Yet Mr. Sillitoe makes a particular point of "accepting" Arthur; indeed, he strongly implies that there is a special sort of realistic virtue in "accepting" him as he is, and not expecting him to become anything very different. This goes a good deal further than that rejection of condescension or designs which I mentioned approvingly at the start of this review, and despite my pleasure in the novel, it leaves me with some doubts.

Mr. Sillitoe's attitude toward Arthur is notably free from moral nagging or political exhortation; but it may be that in its hard-headed and undeluded way it is not quite free from sentimentality, the kind of sentimentality which, passing as cultural relativism or a respect for variant mores, one sometimes finds among anthropologists who celebrate the odd behavior of "their" tribes. It is an attitude which tempts the observer—in this case, the writer—to abandon a little too easily his own standards, his own judgments. It is an attitude that fits a little too conveniently current intellectual and middle class feelings about workers: —*see yonder tamed and vivid beast, munching his fish and chips, frolicking with his beer and telly.* And should not this capacity of a novel for cozying the dominant moods of the moment be at least some cause for uneasiness?

Wooing the Arabs

by John Parker

THE RESUMPTION by Russia, in the course of the past decade, of her 19th Century status as a major Middle Eastern power has been among the most spectacular and far-reaching historical developments of our time. As a result what was for many years virtually a closed area in international politics—one in which, in the last resort one great power or group of powers could make its will prevail—has become very much an open region, within which the clash of rival interests and ideologies is still to be decided.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East
by Walter Z. Laqueur
(Praeger; $6)

In the first part of this book Mr. Laqueur surveys in detail the background to this "great breakthrough" as he calls it, and in the second he examines the stages by which it came about, which, in effect, means going over the long series of crises which have followed one another since the time of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement over the Suez base in July, 1954, and attempting to assess the part played by the Soviet Union in each of them. The narrative is taken down to the end of last year. In both parts the story is told predominantly from Russian sources, as the references make clear; but in the later stages a good deal is said about the ways in which the peoples of the Middle East have reacted to the new influences in their midst.

There were no diplomatic relations between the USSR and the Middle Eastern states until the early 1940's, and the rudimentary local Communist Parties in countries like Egypt, scattered and disorganized and with a largely non-native membership, were not in a position to give clear guidance on the best line to follow. Throughout this period the Soviet leaders could not make up their minds for long whether local nationalist movements should be supported or denounced and opposed; in the Middle East the question was always complicated by the existence of Russia's own considerable Moslem minorities—movements which had a pan-Islamic or pan-Turkic tinge had obviously to be eschewed. Lenin for a while at least favored a policy of cautious co-operation with the national revolutions, but a succession of disillusionments—Mustafa Kemal in Turkey, Reza Shah in Persia (and most important of all, Mr. Laqueur thinks, Stalin's very unhappy experiences with the Kuomintang in China)—brought about a complete abandonment of this way of thinking and led to the "hard line" of the thirties, which, in the Middle East, lasted effectively down to the Second World War.

An occasional dry aside reassures the reader that the author shares his bemused astonishment at the ludicrous picture which is unfolded: the embattled "experts" of the "All-Union Association of Orientalists" in the twenties, or the "University of the Toilers of the East" in the early thirties conducting their virulent polemics about the real nature and significance of events and movements with which they had no first-hand acquaintance, taking place in countries which for the most part they had never visited. Should the Arab revolt in Palestine be regarded as a real agrarian class-struggle, or merely as a movement of discontented feudal landowners? Was Zionism—until the white paper of 1939, at least—purely the tool of British Imperialism, or had it some saving grace? Did the Wafd party in Egypt have any elements of real revolutionary value? The bearers of all the weird Communist *noms-de-plume* whose biographical data the author disentangles and reconstructs contended with one another in a battle of words that is often farcical to read about but was deadly to lose. And in the end they all lost; nearly everybody seems to have come to a bad end in the purges.

By 1939, nothing very striking had been achieved in the attempt to further the progress of the revolution in an area which was, in theory, so ripe for it. But probably nothing much could have been achieved. To most of those who were striving to gain their independence in the Middle East the Soviet Union in this period was a far-off power with no great prestige and no real involvement in the affairs of the region.

The war changed all this, and in the second part of the book we are on more familiar ground. By 1945, Laqueur argues, a completely new and revolutionary situation had come about in the Middle East; the two powers which had hitherto dominated the region had been irremediably weakened and their withdrawal was sooner or later inevitable. Nationalist and anti-Western sentiments of every kind had been greatly stimulated by the war. The local Communist parties had been able to build up their organizations to the extent of providing a useful basis for further expansion. A new kind of intelligentsia, young and eager for fresh ideas, had come into

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Khan of the Sunflowers

WHAT surely was the emperor of spiders
Lived by the coal shed in a sunflower castle
Under a petaled roof that tilted sunward.
He was an oriental. Quite as yellow
As the sun-enamored roof, he had black velvet
Stripes on his cummerbund. His eyes were onyx.
Noons when he crouched at the middle of his silken
Throne room, His Sinister Arachnoid Highness
Was little loved by house flies, gnats, mosquitoes,
Or me. He reigned during my seventh summer.

Repelled and yet attracted by that monarch,
I visited the yellow-shingled castle
Often to see what wingèd thing had blundered
Into the silk hall. For my sister's birthday
Present, I even spurned a dime-store counter
Full of conventional baubles for a spider
Brooch—undeniably Eurasian, having
Brass legs, sky-colored eyes, a "pearl" abdomen.
A marvel, marveled I along the sidewalk,
Congratulating myself on such a handsome
Purchase—and only five (Depression) nickels!
Mother was less enthusiastic. Soon the
Dime-store spider was back in its glass prison,
Glittering wickedly among the brooches.

That was September. Under the imperial
Sunflower the eight-legged tyrant's reign was dwindling
To a violent end. One hostile morning
He was deposed by frost. His castle blackened.
The Zoroastrian roof wearied of watching
The sun and sagged into the silken ceiling
And sagged again.

Not that the melancholy
Event depressed me much: I had discovered
Dragons! Dragons and valiant knights and slumbrous
Beauties and Camelot. Only a time or
Two that delicious fall, between excursions
Into King Arthur Land, I semifancied
A Guinevere as glossy as Jean Harlow,
Snow-blond, and lo! between the fabled nipples
The bright-legged spider with the arresting blue eyes.

JOHN NIXON, JR.

being. Above all, the USSR emerged from the war with an enormously enhanced prestige; it was now indisputably one of the greatest powers, and in assuming this position it had, as far as the Middle East was concerned, a clean sheet; save in Turkey and Persia it had no past to live down. Given these great potentialities, and the further immense advantage that, Russia's own stake in the area being much less vital than that of the West, she enjoyed a far greater freedom of maneuver, it is surprising that it apparently took the Kremlin the best part of ten years to realize how great were the opportunities which awaited it.

The great change came only in 1954-6, and was most dramatically revealed to the world by the arms deal with Egypt in September, 1955. Mr. Laqueur's examination of the stages whereby Russia's present position in the Middle East has been built up rightly emphasizes the new social and political forces which have become prominent since the war; the emergence of a new type of young intellectual in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon, the formation of parties with a coherent program of social reform (such as the Ba'ath, socialists and the "Bandung ideals"), the concept of the "Afro-Asian peoples," and so on. His survey of Middle Eastern diplomacy from 1954-8 does not add very much to what is already known; more interesting, though rather sketchy, are the chapters at the end of the book in which particular aspects of Soviet relations with the Middle East at the present time are surveyed. Emphasis is rightly laid upon the skillful tact with which Soviet economic assistance has been given. It would have been useful to have more detailed information about the results of the great efforts to bring Soviet cultural influences into the area; probably, however, it is too early for these to be fully assessed.

At the end of the book after surveying the effects of the "great breakthrough" on the position and prospects of the local Communist parties, Mr. Laqueur deals with the broader subject of the relations between Communism and Arab nationalism and the prospects for the future should they come into ideological conflict. This is one of the most interesting and original parts of the book, and what he sees as the weaknesses of Arab nationalism "not an ideology, but a state of mind"—a variously assorted collection of ideas, uncertain of its own ultimate roots and not clear as to its final purposes, lacking in positive social content and yet compelled, if it is to achieve final success, to deal effectively with burning social issues—are eloquently set out. Obviously the author has no great faith in the ability of such a phenomenon, in the long run, to ward off successfully Communist domination.

Many would disagree with the estimate of Arab nationalism which lies behind this analysis, and feel that it does scant justice to its intellectual coherence, its passionate convictions or to its probable powers of development in the face of altering conditions. But there will be little dissent from the author's final conclusion that the present phase of Soviet Middle Eastern relations is unlikely to last long. His book is a valuable contribution to recent Middle Eastern historiography; by setting out in a clear and intelligible pattern so much information that has hitherto been hard to come by it should stimulate further study of the problems with which it deals.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THEATER

Poetic Drama on European Stages

POPULAR and critical response, or lack of response, to the recent admirable revival of Shelley's *The Cenci* at London's Old Vic suggests once again the curiously limited expectations which seem to afflict Englishmen—and Americans—when they go to the theater.

The Cenci, is fast, tense, psychologically profound, and clothed in magnicent language. In the horror of its fable —Count Cenci's incestuous abuse of his beautiful and sensitive daughter and the parricide through which she avenges herself—it has the theatrical potential of the Jacobean masterpieces of Webster and Ford, but it is a play whose horrors are not of Italy but of the soul, its qualities as drama resting finally neither in its violence nor in its conflicts of personality but in a set of shatteringly unresolved tensions between good and evil, illusion and reality. "Those to whom evil is done do evil in return," and one of the more frightening things the play does is to force us to recognize in Beatrice her father's daughter. Goaded beyond endurance by the outrage she has suffered, she shows in her revenge her father's lineaments — cold determination, magnificent energy, iron contempt for any morality not of her own making. And when, in the great scene of her defense, she denies having killed her father, the very terms "murder," "father," and "guilt" are called in question by her passionate casuistry.

The impact of *The Cenci* depends on the psychological believability of its two protagonists, and it is in his handling of them that Shelley most surely reveals his instinctive dramatic genius. Cenci is a finely detailed study of a sadist—a man whose grotesquely developed ego must, now that he is threatened by the impotence of age, express itself sexually through refinements of cruelty directed at his children and thus symbolically at himself. Beatrice, on one level a typical Shelleyan embodiment of the ideals of liberty and love, is also a profoundly credible portrait of a woman who has suffered the trauma of sexual abuse.

BUT Cenci and Beatrice are more than clinical studies. The old count anticipates Father Karamazov as clearly as he echoes the Marquis de Sade, and Beatrice, in her perception of the metaphysical horror of her situation, places her individual dilemma in a universal perspective. *The Cenci* is, among other things, a play about fatherhood. Cenci's perversion of the father's function is reflected on the religio-political level by the cruel and venal Pope's denial of mercy to Beatrice and her accomplices. The actual father and the holy father have proved monsters of cruelty and injustice, exhorted, at the end of the play, to trust in God, Beatrice replies:

> I hope I do trust in Him. In whom else
> Can I trust?

The implied affirmation is decidedly less than absolute, and her question is a tragic one.

The experience of seeing Shelley's play staged can only leave one with a deeper regret that the poet's early death cancelled what might have been a 19th-century rebirth of poetic drama in England. We who speak the tongue of Shakespeare seem, in the last 200 years, to have developed an antipathy toward eloquence on stage. Cultivated people who read Yeats and Rilke, enjoy Bartok and Stravinsky, lower their sights when the house-lights go down, and half-way sympathize with the vulgar brute who, during the swiftly paced murder scene of the *Cenci* I saw, shouted out "Let's get on with it."

If the language of *The Cenci* were "poetic" in the sense of being decorative, fancy, the rejection of the play would be comprehensible. But the most poetic thing about Shelley's diction in this instance is its complete absorption in its dramatic function. The image of blood, for example, which dominates the texture of the play from the time of Beatrice's entrance after her violation—

> Reach me that handkerchief! — My brain is hurt;
> My eyes are full of blood . . .

—is used not as an ornament but as an articulation of the whole dramatic complex—Cenci's cruelty, his bestial lust, Beatrice's defloration, and, most of all, the fact of their consanguinity. Drama presents man in action, but it does so through the agency of words, and no great drama can exist where words are not held in esteem.

There must be a reason for this strange distrust of the word in the Anglo-American theater. It does not exist on the continent; one need only think of Vienna or Munich, where full houses concentrate on the masterpieces of Schiller and Grillparzer—didactic, intellectual, "poetic" to a far greater degree than Shelley's *Cenci.* Or of Paris, where the tradition of the poetic and intellectual theater has persisted from Hugo and Musset to Giraudoux and Anouilh, to mention only post-classical dramatists. It is seldom that the master of language is, like Shakespeare, an equal master of craft. But if we reject the master of language who is also at least competent at the craft of theater, we deprive ourselves of something we cannot do without. Perhaps the stark fact of Shakespeare in our history has left us perversely unwilling to accept any master of language who is not also a supreme master of craft.

IT IS fanciful, however, to assume that it is the greatness of Shakespeare which has inhibited the English dramatist. Perhaps the explanation is the simple one offered by Shaw in the preface to his *Plays Unpleasant,* in which he refers to Henry Fielding's abandonment of the drama in annoyance at Walpole's censorship: "Fielding, driven out of the trade of Molière and Aristophanes, took to that of Cervantes; and since then the English novel has been one of the glories of literature, whilst the English drama has been its disgrace." In any case, the fact of the Anglo-American attitude is there, and it explains why our drama tends to split itself into compartments labeled "entertainment," "realism," and

"ONE CANNOT LIVE *on capital forever. A tradition, however firmly rooted, if it is never watered, though it dies hard, yet in the end it dies. And today a great number—perhaps the majority—of the men and women who handle our affairs, write our books and our newspapers, carry out research, present our plays and our films, speak from our platforms and pulpits—yes, and who educate our young people, have never, even in lingering traditional memory, undergone the scholastic discipline. We have lost the tools of learning."*

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. N-3, 150 E. 35th St., N.Y. 16, N.Y., for a free copy.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"poetry," seldom achieving that fusion of the three on which all drama lives.

Strangely enough, in view of my reference to Shaw's remarks, a play by Fielding turned up in the current London season—*Look Up Your Daughters,* Bernard Miles' adaptation (to music) of Fielding's *Rape upon Rape.* Not among the more important achievements of the 18th-Century dramatist, it suffered in adaptation through having its satiric teeth drawn and through being equipped with a score which, in its tinny triviality, managed to combine the worst features of the juke box and the music hall. Despite some attractive young players and a charming setting in the new Mermaid Theater it is trash. It also bids fair to be the hit of the season.

THERE IS, of course, nothing in England or America strictly comparable to the Comédie Française. The venerable institution has its weaknesses—any group so closely identified with tradition and officialdom is bound to— and at times its playing is routine, its stylized diction monotonous. But the fact remains that Paris, unlike New York or London, has a state theater which regularly presents a repertoire of 20 or 25 works of dramatic art, classic and contemporary, and presents them with taste, intelligence, and an enviable degree of ensemble excellence. Henry de Montherlant's *La Reine Morte* has in recent years become one of the staples of the modern repertoire at the Comédie. Although Montherlant, the aristocratic exponent of an austere mystique of individualism and pride, is very unlike Shelley, the liberal and humanitarian idealist, *La Reine Morte* is surprisingly similar to *The Cenci.* It, too, is a bloody history of familial hatred and confused motives, a drama which operates through the tension of opposed life-views. It deals with the doomed love of Pedro, 15th-Century Infante of Portugal, and Ines de Castro, the court lady to whom he is secretly married, but Montherlant focussed his attention on Ferrante, the king, who ultimately orders the murder of Ines, not for reasons of state but because age and imminent death have driven him to an act of purely gratuitous cruelty, an act whose perverse appeal he cannot resist. He has become, like Cenci, the servant of death.

The complexity of the play derives from the fact that it is Ferrante who is the spokesman for Montherlant's ideas and that it is he who is the most sympathetic character in the play. Wiser, more sensitive, than either of the young lovers, he is the embodiment of the dramatist's cult of the aristocrat. But in the last act of the play he weaves his own damnation, while Ines, the embodiment of the female principle—the life principle—is vindicated in her death.

Montherlant is, like Shelley, not afraid of language. *La Reine Morte* abounds in long speeches, complicated analyses of motive, and lyric interludes. But the audience at the Comédie reacts very differently from a West End or a Broadway audience. The Act II council scene, in which Ferrante refutes his ministers' arguments for the assassination of Ines, the Act III monologue in which he explores the devious impulses which lead him to order that assassination, were absorbed in tense silence by an audience trained by tradition to respond to the drama of the mind as well as to the drama of sensation. This attitude does not mean, however, that a Comédie audience is necessarily uncritical, or that it checks its sense of the ridiculous at the door. The end of *La Reine Morte* was blemished by an untidy bit of direction: as Pedro is made king, his courtiers sink to their knees by the dead body of Ines; the director, it seems, instructed them to mouth something which sounded like "beady beady beady" in order to simulate muttered Latin. It didn't, and titters with an overtone of menace rippled through the audience.

But the important point about the classic theater, as in Germany or Austria or Scandinavia, is that it exists in the context of a general recognition of drama and of art as something unique and important. The chief outward sign of this recognition is the full-scale, heavily subsidized state theater. When England or America achieves such a theater, the English-speaking stage may be ready to receive Shelley—or to accept the new poetic drama when it comes.

FRANK J. WARNKE

Notes on Contributors

JOHN PARKER is a British writer on world affairs, at present living in Cyprus. JOHN NIXON, JR. is a young Virginia poet. FRANK J. WARNKE is on the English faculty of Yale.

AUTHORS WANTED BY N. Y. PUBLISHER

New York, N. Y.—One of the nation's largest book publishers is seeking manuscripts of all types—fiction, non-fiction, poetry. Special attention to new writers. If your work is ready for publication, send for booklet RP—*it's free.* Vantage Press, 120 W. 31st St., New York 1. (Midwest Office: 220 So. Michigan Ave., Chicago 4, Ill.)

EUROPE

We'll see the usual, plus Dublin past the Iron Curtain—Africa to Sweden. A different trip—for the young in spirit who want to be accompanied but not herded around. Also shorter trips. $724-$1390.
EUROPE SUMMER TOURS
255 Sequoia, Box NR Pasadena, California

EXPERIMENT WITH "SLEEP-LEARNING!"
Self-hypnosis. Use your phonograph, recorder. Fascinating, educational. Details free.
Sleep-Learning Research Association
Box 24-NP OLYMPIA, WASHINGTON

JOBS ABROAD FOR TEACHERS, writers, librarians, translators, stenographers, and administrators. Top salaries paid by American and foreign companies, governmental and international organizations. How, when and where to apply, $1.00. Included free "Student Opportunities Abroad." Dorf, 186-NR, Covington Lane, Woodbury, N. J.

MOVING?
INVESTIGATE THIS NEW WAY OF LIFE FOR LIBERALS
Raise your children in the free, healthy atmosphere of an intelligently integrated development. Modern 6-8 room homes, superior construction and planning from $13,000 to $29,000. Buy, rent. Philadelphia, Princeton, New York, Connecticut areas. Represented by Concord Association. Modern Community Developers, subsidiary. Contact Stuart E. Wallace, 84 Nassau St., Princeton, New Jersey, WAlnut 4-0701. In Philadelphia area, MErcury 9-4576.

SEEK sponsor, collaborator publish truth Govt., scholars suppressed 100 years re a Founding Father's private life. Not debunking, mucking. Invites his deification. Researcher, 124-14 Cranston Av, Belle Harbor, 94, N. Y.

FREE BOOK SEARCH SERVICE
For current, rare, old or out-of-print books. Write for information or send list to Dept. R.
Libertarian Bookman
Box 7709 Chicago 80, Ill.

NEW OPPORTUNITY—GIVES EXTRA MONEY for you or your organization. Show **MASTERPIECES BY EVANS,** fabulously-beautiful Christmas cards. Wonderful assortment for persons, business houses. Send for **FREE** luxurious album of 86 magnificent 1959 selections. Also, **FREE** "Complete Guide For Fund-Raising For Your Club." Write: **New England Art Publishers, North Abington 869, Mass.**

WE MOVE YOU WITHOUT TEARS
Economical, insured household moving. Vans, station wagons. Any time, any place. **The Padded Wagon, AL 5-8343 (NYC)**

BRITISH SHOES FOR GENTLEMEN at a fraction of their American retail price! $10.95 includes duty and import charges. Delivery in ten days from receipt of order. Unconditional money back guarantee. Write for free illustrated catalogue. Steven Williams, Jr., Ltd., 40 Chatham Road, Short Hills, New Jersey.

PRINTED BY NATIONAL PUBLISHING CO., 301 N ST., N.E., WASHINGTON 2, D. C.

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AUGUST BOOK SALE!

Exciting books for the whole family! New books from leading publishers, many at bargain prices. Limited quantities.

1. **THE METAPHYSICAL LOVE.** Magnificent, beautifully illustrated-in-color edition of Abraham Cowley's soul-stirring love poems. Specially bound. Handsomely boxed. LIMITED EDITION. $1.49

2. **THE MALE HORMONE.** Paul de Kruif tells without blushes or polite evasions the story of the sex hormone and its new gleam of hope for prolonging man's prime of life. $1.98

3. **A STUDY IN ATHEISM.** Richard Scott's dynamic book that examines with a critical eye all the arguments for the existence of "god". 1.98

4. **THE FAIR SEX.** 54 magnificent studies of the undraped female figure, as captured by great photographers. Many full page, in color. $1

5. **STARS IN YOUR KITCHEN:** A cookbook of favorite recipes of 148 famous celebrities, Eisenhower, Truman, Duke of Windsor. $1.98

6. **COMMUNIST TRAIL IN AMERICA.** Jacob Spolansky's detailed account of spying and subversion in our own back yard. Pub. $4. Sale: $1

6. **LINCOLN IN CARICATURE.** Rich collection of 163 full-page caricatures some extremely rare, some extremely shocking. Pub. $7.50. $2.98

7. **THE PRIVATE LIVES OF THE DUKE AND DUCHESS OF WINDSOR.** Norman Lockridge's explosive book that the New York Police Department suppressed. Inside stories never told before. The Duke of Windsor's struggle with some of the most harrowing weaknesses to afflict the human flesh. Illus. Paper cover. $2.00

8. **MUTINY IN JANUARY.** Carl Van Doren's story of a crisis in the Continental army—now for the first time fully told from many hitherto unknown sources. Illus. $2.98

9. **SEX: METHODS AND MANNERS.** By Dr. I. Berg and R. Street. The most direct straightforward guide to achieving sex happiness in marriage ever written. Controversial and startling in parts, this book will alert even the most jaded. Illustrated. $3.50

10. **NATIONALITY & ITS PROBLEMS.** by S. Herbert. A penetrating study of nationalism, with a history up to the League of Nations. $1

11. **THE ADVENTURE OF THE NEGRO FREEDMAN.** The life and problems of the ex-slaves in the early years after emancipation. Conflicts, tension, poverty—and how they overcame them. Sale: $1.98

12. **OLD MASTERS IN AMERICA.** A comprehensive guide to over 2000 original paintings by 40 famous artists—where they are located and how to look at them intelligently. Dozens of illus. $2.98

13. **THE STORY OF SCIENCE.** David Dietz's clearly written book for the layman: Astronomy, biology, geology, physics and chemistry. The story of the Universe. The Earth. The Atom and Life. Illus. Charts, index, etc. $1.49

14. **SELECTED WRITINGS OF DE SADE.** Copious extracts from such notorious works as JUSTINE, JULIETTE, and other forbidden classics make up this volume of debauchery. $4.95

15. **OUR INVISIBLE FRIENDS.** Maurice Allen's astounding scientific experiment with the spirit world—the account of his psychic shuttling "between two worlds"! Scarce. 4.95

16. **THE LOVE OF WOMAN.** Poems by William Shakespeare. Beautifully produced in The Golden Eagle Press Edition. Handsome golden slipcase. LIMITED EDITION. $1.49

17. **LINCOLN AND THE WAR GOVERNORS,** by W. Hesseltine. Here, told for the first time, is Lincoln's wartime struggle for troops and supplies with his own Northern governors. The masterful tactics he used in party politics, the first conscription, elections, etc. Pub. $6—Sale $2.50

18. **HISTORIC HOMES OF EARLY AMERICA.** Elsie Lathrop's classic work—Hundreds of homes from humble cabins to magnificent Mansions that figured in the building of America. Lavishly illustrated 100 photographs. Special: $2.98

19. **WOMEN IN THE SACRED SCRIPTURES OF HINDUISM.** The unusual history of women in the orient, as revealed for the first time. $1.98

20. **SEXUAL ABERRATIONS,** by Wilhelm Steckel. The classic work on the disorders of the instincts and emotions, with particular reference to fetishism in all its puzzling and fascinating variety. Many cases described at length. 2 volumes. $9.95

21. **THE COSMIC COMMONWEALTH,** by E. Holmes. Remarkably penetrating study of "God," nature, man & the world. Thought provoking. 50c

22. **WASHINGTON'S FAREWELL ADDRESS.** Here in a masterpiece of fine bookmaking, is one of the most moving and touching orations in the history of mankind. Golden Eagle Press. $1.49

23. **LOVE AND MARRIAGE THRU THE AGES.** Sexual communism, the capture of women, buying a wife, and other subjects are touched upon in this soft covered book by Louis Harris. 50c

24. **PATRICIA McCORMICK: LADY BULLFIGHTER.** The vivid, personal story of a girl from Texas who became internationally famous as a bullfighter. Photo illustrations. Sale: $1.98

25. **SINFUL CITIES OF THE WESTERN WORLD.** Hendrik de Leeuw's revealing, first hand story of the international traffic in Womanhood. The author takes you on a scarlet tour of nine cities. Algiers, Paris, Berlin, Marseilles. Startling. Wicked. $3.95

26. **SIR RICHARD BURTON'S KASIDAH OF HAJI ABDU.** Magnificent gold-stamped binding. Golden Eagle Press Edition of the classic poem. Superbly produced. LIMITED EDITION. $1.49

27. **A HISTORY AND AN ARGUMENT: THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS.** Colonel Robert R. McCormick's unusual, thoughtful and controversial book. $1.49

28. **Vets: YOU GOT IT COMING TO YOU!** The only book containing complete information for the serviceman, veteran, and members of his family. Answers to questions about rights, benefits, and privileges. "Worth its weight in Government checks." $3.50

29. **ARTIST'S MODELS,** by John Evared. Over 1,200 superb art studies of the human figure—every conceivable pose, position and action the artist must need. Contents: 500 photos of posed nudes: 100 five-minute sketch poses, etc. 8"x11". Handsomely produced. Import. $10

30. **HOLIDAY BOOK OF FOOD AND DRINK.** Flavored, palate-tickling, mouth-watering talk about food and drink. Anecdotes, recipes, feasts. Illustrated. $2.98

31. **AN EXHORTATION TO MARRIAGE.** Love Sonnets by William Shakespeare. Beautifully produced, in a handsome golden slipcase. $1.49

32. **LINCOLN IN MARBLE & BRONZE,** by F. Bullard. How the great sculptors have seen the immortal President is revealed in this fascinating account, along with 68 vivid photos of the most famous sculptures. Pub. at $12.50—$2.98

33. **F.D.R.: COLUMNIST.** Here are the hitherto uncollected writings of Roosevelt as a substitute newspaper columnist. A candid snapshot $1.98

34. **BETTER HEARING,** by L. Brentano. Practical guidance for the hard-of-hearing. Dozens of ways to overcome the handicap of weakened hearing. Illus. Stiff wrappers. $1.49

35. **THE GREAT CHARLIE CHAPLIN.** A lively biography of the Tramp, by Robert Payne. A penetrating look at the world's famous comedian—with 19 memorable stills from such Chaplin classics as "The Gold Rush", "Modern Times", "City Lights". Pub. at $4. $1.98

36. **CENSORED MOTHER GOOSE RHYMES.** Twitting The Censors: who have taught us to read naughty meaning into harmless words $1.25

37. **Benjamin Franklin's A DISSERTATION ON LIBERTY AND NECESSITY, PLEASURE AND AND PAIN.** Reproduced from the scarce First Edition. Facsimile Text Society Edition, 1980. Last few. $1.98

38. **THREE OF A KIND: WINE, WOMAN AND TALE.** A naughty frolic in the manner of Boccaccio. Soft cover. Scarce, ribald. $1.98

39. **MASTER ART FORGER,** by J. Godley. The stranger-than-fiction story of a second-rate artist who painted six "Vermeers" and two "De Hooch"—undetected until he confessed! Ill. $1.98

40. **ACADEMIC PROCESSION: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE.** Ernest Earnest's lively, informal history of higher education. Rowdy, free-wheeling students versus the villagers, subversion on the campus, students' "sex codes", etc. Illus. Pub. $4—Sale: $1.98

41. **THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT.** Seventeen of our greatest political scientists examine different governments of the world. The stubbornness of tradition in "democratic" post-war Germany, the docility of the Japanese masses, World Federation—its advantages and drawbacks. Seventeen forceful, absorbing, authoritative chapters. Pub. at $6— Sale: $1.98

42. **CUISINE D'AMOUR: A COOKBOOK FOR LOVERS.** Food in use for many centuries, especially designed for physical regeneration, vigor and health. 200 selected historical recipes. LIMITED EDITION. $2.98

FREE!! With every order over $6 we will include Book: "1001 THINGS YOU CAN GET FREE!" Free gifts, products, services, books, photos, guides, etc., etc., etc.

WORLD WIDE BOOK SERVICE **NR 6**
525 Broadway, New York 12

Gentlemen: Please send me, postage prepaid, the books numbered below. I understand if my order is over $6 I will receive ABSOLUTELY FREE "1001 THINGS YOU CAN GET FREE." I enclose $.....

NAME.....

ADDRESS.....

CITY.....ZONE.....STATE.....

LICENSED TO UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED